

SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS REPORT

# AFP Facebook Comment Analysis

## Hun Manet Scam Centre Interview

*Sentiment | Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour | Bot Detection | Comment Trends*

<b>Subject</b>	AFP post: "Scam centres 'destroying' Cambodia's economy, PM tells AFP"
<b>Post ID</b>	1343523617820612_1582
<b>Comment Period</b>	26–27 February 2026
<b>Report Date</b>	28 February 2026
<b>Total Comments</b>	1,489 comments from 1,453 accounts
<b>Analyst Note</b>	This report covers comments in English and Khmer only. Comments in other languages (Thai, Arabic, etc.) are listed as Unclassifiable and are not analysed.

## Purpose of This Report

This study was carried out to answer five key questions about the public comments on AFP's Facebook post about PM Hun Manet's scam centre interview:

#	Research Question
1	Is the comment section genuine? Do the comments reflect real public opinion, or were they posted as part of a planned campaign?
2	Was the topic changed? Did commenters engage with the subject of scam centres, or did a large group use the comment section to push a different message?
3	Were the same messages copied and shared? How many comments are word-for-word copies of each other, and how many different template texts were used?
4	Were automated tools (bots) used? Are there accounts that posted comments too fast for a human to type — suggesting that computer programs were used instead of real people?
5	Are accounts targeting a specific audience through language choice and are any accounts hiding their identity? Does the language used in a comment reflect who the writer is, or who they are trying to reach? Are there signs that accounts may be writing in a language that is not their own in order to speak directly to a specific national or group?

## Executive Summary

This report looks at 1,489 public comments on AFP's Facebook post. The post was about Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, who spoke about scam centres in Cambodia. In his interview, he pushed back on claims that the government helped scam operators.

The analysis covers two days: 26–27 February 2026. It studies what people said, whether the comments were real or copied, and whether any accounts may have been automated (bots).

### Main Finding 1 — Most Comments Are Copied

Nearly 8 out of every 10 comments (79.8%) are word-for-word copies of the same texts. The same message was posted by different accounts — up to 19 times. This is a sign of a planned campaign, not natural public discussion.

### Main Finding 2 — The Topic Was Changed

The most common comments (973 out of 1,489) did not talk about scam centres at all. Instead, they pushed a message about a Cambodia–Thailand border disagreement. This is a common trick to change the subject and hide the original issue.

### Main Finding 3 — Evidence of Automated (Bot) Posting

Two accounts posted long messages within 3 to 13 seconds of their previous post. A person cannot type that fast. This strongly suggests that computer programs, not people, were used to post these comments.

### Main Finding 4 — Comments Appeared in a Short Burst

Almost all copied comments appeared within just two hours (21:00–22:00 UTC on 26 February). This sudden burst then quick stop is not normal reader behaviour. It suggests a group of accounts was switched on and off together.

# 1. Overview

The table below shows the main numbers from this study:

<h2>1,489</h2> <p><b>Total Comments</b> 26–27 Feb 2026</p>	<h2>1,453</h2> <p><b>Unique Accounts</b> Most posted once</p>	<h2>79.8%</h2> <p><b>Copied Comments</b> 1,188 out of 1,489</p>	<h2>160</h2> <p><b>Template Texts</b> Shared across accounts</p>
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At first, the numbers look normal. Most accounts posted only once. But the content they posted was almost all copied from ready-made texts. About four out of five comments were not original. This is very unusual and suggests the comment section was manipulated.

# 2. Comment Trend by Hour

The chart below shows how many comments were posted each hour. All times are shown as recorded (UTC).




Figure 1: Number of comments per hour. Data source: FB Post ID 1343523617820612

## Key Observations

The comment activity shows a very clear pattern. There were very few comments in the morning and early afternoon. Then there was a small rise at 16:00 UTC (107 comments). After that, the number jumped sharply:

- 21:00 UTC — 345 comments posted in one hour
- 22:00 UTC — 814 comments posted in one hour (the highest point)

- 23:00 UTC — only 17 comments, showing a sudden stop

This rise-and-fall pattern in just two hours is unusual. Natural commenting usually spreads out over many hours. The sharp peak at 22:00 UTC followed by an almost instant stop suggests that a large group of accounts was activated at the same time, posted their messages, and then stopped.

#### Important Note on the Surge

The 814 comments posted at 22:00 UTC is about 55% of the total 1,489 comments — all within one single hour. Nearly all of these comments were copied texts. This timing pattern, combined with the very high duplication rate, is a strong indicator of a coordinated operation.

## 3. What People Said: Sentiment Analysis

Each comment was placed into one of five groups based on its meaning. The table below shows the results:

Group	Comments	Share	Main Message
<b>Pro-Cambodia — Border Defence</b>	973	65.3%	Cambodia follows international law; Thailand is aggressive
Pro-Cambodia — Scam Crackdown Support	25	1.7%	Government is doing a good job fighting scam centres
Critical of Hun Manet	71	4.8%	Questions PM's claims or government actions
Pro-Thailand	1	0.07%	Supports Thailand's position
Neutral / Solutions-Focused	8	0.54%	Offers balanced views or proposes solutions
Unclassifiable	411	27.6%	Emoji, unclear meaning, or non-English/Khmer languages
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,489</b>	<b>100%</b>	

### 3.1 Pro-Cambodia — Border Defence (973 comments, 65.3%)

This is the largest group by far — 65.3% of all comments. However, these comments do not talk about scam centres. They talk about a border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. This means nearly two-thirds of all comments ignored the subject of the AFP article entirely.

Some of the most common messages were:

- "Cambodia obeys law. Thailand breaks rules." — posted by 14 different accounts with the exact same words
- "Cambodia respects borders. Thailand crosses them." — posted by 14 accounts
- "Thailand attacks it." — posted by 15 accounts

- "Thailand rejects peaceful solutions." — posted by 13 accounts
- In Khmer (exact text): "កម្ពុជាកំទ្រសន្តិភាព និងជ្រើសរើសច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ ខណៈដែលថែទាំតែអំណាច និងសង្គ្រាម បដិសេធច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ។" — posted by 19 accounts with identical text

Changing the subject of a comment section to a different topic is a known method used in online influence operations. It is done to push away genuine debate.

### 3.2 Critical of Hun Manet (71 comments, 4.8%)

A small number of comments questioned PM Hun Manet's statements or expressed doubt about the government's role in the scam industry. These comments appear to be written by real, independent users. They use different words and were posted at different times. The most-liked comment in the whole dataset — "He's a PM. or an actor?" comes from this group.

### 3.3 Pro-Thailand (1 comment, 0.1%)

Only one comment was found to support Thailand's position. This is interesting because the dominant message in the comment section is strongly anti-Thailand. The near-total absence of pro-Thailand voices despite the anti-Thailand campaign.

1 The author of this report can read Khmer and English only. Comments written in other languages — such as Thai, Arabic, or other scripts — have been placed in the Unclassifiable category and are not included in this analysis. It is possible that some of these comments express support for Thailand or other positions that are not captured here.

### 3.4 Unclassifiable (411 comments, 27.6%)

More than a quarter of all comments (27.6%) could not be clearly placed into a group. These include comments with only emoji, very short comments without clear meaning, and — importantly — comments in languages other than Khmer and English (see footnote 1). These were not analysed for sentiment.

### 3.5 Neutral / Solutions-Focused (8 comments, 0.54%)

A very small number of comments (eight in total) offered balanced views or proposed real solutions to the scam centre problem. Despite being very few in number, these are worth reading. They contain the only genuine policy ideas in the entire comment section.

#### Solutions Proposed by Neutral Commenters

The eight neutral comments raised four main ideas:

- Comprehensive enforcement strategy: The most-liked neutral comment (from user Roth BKK, 1 like) called for a full approach that goes beyond short-term police raids. It listed specific elements: prevention, investigation, public education, regulatory improvement, and international cooperation. A nearly identical version was also posted by another account (Chou) suggesting even some neutral content may be coordinated.
- Economic reform: Ly Sok wrote simply: "We need honest economy not scam economy." This captures a broader concern that Cambodia's economy has become too dependent on criminal revenue and needs structural reform.
- High-level accountability: Two commenters pointed directly at powerful officials. គឹម ស៊ានរីរឹ: wrote: "We need to clean from top echelon I think." Sorng Viseth was more direct: "He failed to crack down on the scam hubs at the beginning as it involves high ranking people in his government!"
- Regional cooperation: Phuong Vichea raised the cross-border dimension noting that scam money flows through Thailand's grey capital market suggesting the problem cannot be solved by Cambodia alone.

Two neutral comments are in Khmer. Soury Mouy wrote "ខ្ញុំសូមអរគុណដែលនិយាយការពិត ❤️" ("Thank you for speaking the truth") an expression of appreciation for the PM's interview. Sokry Moun wrote "សូមអោយមនុស្សលោកប្រកបរបរដោយសុចរិត 🙏🙏🙏" ("Please let people work honestly") a moral call for honest work. These two did not propose specific policy solutions.

**Observation on Neutral Comments**

Although only 8 comments (0.54%) were classified as neutral or solutions-focused, they contain the most substantive thinking in the entire dataset. The dominant message across 1,489 comments is about the Cambodia–Thailand border — not about how to actually fight scam centres. The neutral commenters are the only voices who directly address the subject of the AFP article.

## 4. Signs of a Coordinated Campaign

This section explains why the comment activity looks organised and not natural.

### 4.1 Copied Comments

A comment is considered a copy when its full text matches another comment exactly. In this dataset, 79.8% of comments are copies.

The copies were not random. They came from a set of 160 ready-made message texts — each used by many different accounts:

Times Copied	Message	Language
19	កម្ពុជាគាំទ្រសន្តិភាព និងជ្រើសរើសច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ ខណៈដែលថៃគិតតែអំណាច និងសង្គ្រាម បដិសេធច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ។	Khmer
18	កម្ពុជាបង្ហាញការស្មោះត្រង់ចំពោះសន្តិភាព និងជ្រើសរើសច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ ក្នុងពេលដែលថៃបដិសេធច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ និងធ្វើសង្គ្រាម។	Khmer
18	កម្ពុជាគាំទ្រសន្តិភាព និងជ្រើសរើសច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ តែថៃវិញជ្រើសរើសការប្រើកម្លាំង និងមិនគោរពច្បាប់អន្តរជាតិ។	Khmer
15	"Thailand attacks it."	English
14	"Cambodia obeys law. Thailand breaks rules."	English
14	"Cambodia respects borders. Thailand crosses them."	English
13	"Thailand rejects peaceful solutions."	English
13	"Cambodia stands firm in law."	English

These messages appear to have been written in advance and given to a large number of accounts to post. The fact that both short messages ("Thailand attacks it.") and long multi-sentence messages were all shared without any change shows that the comments were carefully prepared.

### 4.2 The Two-Hour Posting Burst

The timeline chart in Section 2 shows that almost all copied comments appeared during just two hours. The exact breakdown is:

- Before 21:00 UTC: 49 duplicate comments total (4.1% of all duplicates)
- 21:00–22:00 UTC: 1,139 duplicate comments (95.9% of all duplicates)
- After 23:00 UTC: activity dropped back to nearly zero

**Why This Pattern Matters**

When a post gets many comments, they usually come in slowly over many hours — as people from different countries and time zones read the article. A sudden, large wave of comments all within two hours, followed by an instant stop, does not match normal reader behaviour. It is much more consistent with a group of accounts being switched on at the same time, posting their messages, and then switching off.

## 5. Bot Detection: Typing Speed Analysis

For every account that posted more than once, this study measured how many seconds passed between their posts and how many characters each post contained. This allows a calculation of how fast they would have needed to type.

**Reference<sup>1</sup>: How Fast Can Humans Type?**

An average adult types about 200 characters per minute (around 3–4 characters per second). A very fast (competitive) typist can reach about 600 characters per minute (around 10 characters per second). Any speed above around 16 characters per second (955 cpm<sup>2</sup> the world record) for a long text is not possible for a person typing normally.

Eleven pairs of posts were found where the same account posted twice within 60 seconds. The table below shows all of them:

Account Name	Posts	Seconds Apart	Post 1 Chars	Post 2 Chars	Chars per Second	Risk Level
Jee Naa	2	3	637	637	424.7	Very High
Charntharn Lout	2	13	1,891	1,879	290.0	Very High
ปล่อยเป็ย ปล่อยเป็ย	4	39	22	2,174	56.3	High
Tanawat Pangpan	4	37	779	779	42.1	High
Swang Krajangta	2	13	70	57	9.8	Moderate
Keng Jing	3	33	96	96	5.8	Moderate
คน หลังจาก	5	49	220	16	4.8	Moderate
Neang Run	2	32	21	50	2.2	Low
مايا ساكورا الزهور العطرة	4	55	43	32	1.4	Low
Angkor Cambodia	2	30	8	28	1.2	Low

<sup>1</sup> *Druide informatique inc. (2026). Typing speed. Typing Pal. <https://www.typingpal.com/en/documentation/school-edition/pedagogical-resources/typing-speed>*

<sup>2</sup> *Characters Per Minute (CPM)*

## 5.1 Very High Risk: Near-Certain Automated Posting

### Jee Naa — 424.7 characters per second

This account posted the same 637-character message twice with only 3 seconds in between. To do this by hand would require typing 2,548 words per minute — more than 40 times faster than a world-record typist. The two posts are also word-for-word identical, which means the text was copied and pasted, not typed. This account almost certainly used an automated tool.

### Charntharn Lout — 290.0 characters per second

This account posted two very similar messages (about 1,880 characters each) only 13 seconds apart. The messages also contain a clear error: words are doubled throughout, for example "Thai Thai Army Army has has invaded invaded deeper deeper". This kind of doubling is a common sign of a script-based posting error, where automated text was processed incorrectly.

## 5.2 High Risk: Likely Automated

Two more accounts show speeds that are very unlikely for normal manual posting. Tanawat Pangpan (42.1 chars/sec) posted the same 779-character text twice in 37 seconds. The account **ปล่อยเป็ย ปล่อยเป็ย** (56.3 chars/sec) posted a 2,174-character message only 39 seconds after a short post. Both accounts posted multiple times in total.

# 6. Account Name Patterns and Identity Analysis

This section looks at who the most active posters are, what language their names are written in, and whether their name matches the language and content of their comments. Account names alone cannot confirm an account is fake, but patterns across the dataset reveal useful signals about who is speaking and whether any accounts may be hiding their true identity.

## 6.1 Name Script Breakdown (Full Dataset)

Account names across all 1,489 posts fall into four language groups:

Name Script	Total Posts	Unique Accounts	Dominant Content
Latin / Romanised Khmer	961	938	Mix: Pro-Cambodia (604) + Anti-Hun Manet (62) + others
Khmer script	488	488	Almost entirely Pro-Cambodia border (topic)
Thai script	36	26	100% Anti-Cambodia or Anti-Hun Manet content

Name Script	Total Posts	Unique Accounts	Dominant Content
Arabic script (mixed name)	4	1	Anti-Hun Manet, written in English

## 6.2 Top 10 Most Active Accounts

Only 36 accounts posted more than once. The table below shows the top 10. This is an important point: all genuine human multi-posters appear to be critics of the government. The only repeat-posting Pro-Cambodia account is a near-certain bot.

Account Name	Posts	Likes	Name Script	Comment Lang.	Stance
คน หลังกจาก	5	19	Thai	English	Anti-Cambodia / Critical
مايا ساكورا الزهور العطرة	4	0	Arabic	English	Anti-Hun Manet
ปล่อยเป็ย ปล่อยเป็ย	4	0	Thai	Thai+English	Anti-Cambodia
จิตรลดา อาจหาญ	4	0	Thai	English	Anti-Cambodia
Tanawat Pangpan	4	0	Latin	Thai+English	Anti-Cambodia
Keng Jing	3	0	Latin	English	Anti-Hun Manet
Jee Naa	2	0	Latin	English	PRO-Cambodia (bot, identical posts)
Eno Enofive	2	1	Latin	English	Anti-Hun Manet
Sunrise Buser	2	0	Latin	English	Critical / Mixed
Chuti Mekanontchai	2	13	Latin	Thai+English	Anti-Hun Manet

### Key Finding — Bot-Suspicious Accounts Exist on Both Sides

Among the 10 most active accounts, 6 also appear in the bot detection table (Section 5). Of these, Jee Naa (Very High risk, 424.7 chars/sec) is the only repeat Pro-Cambodia poster — and is a near-certain bot. However, two anti-Cambodia accounts — ปล่อยเป็ย ปล่อยเป็ย (High risk, 56.3 chars/sec) and Tanawat Pangpan (High risk, 42.1 chars/sec) — are also flagged for likely automated posting. This shows that bot-suspicious behaviour is not limited to the Pro-Cambodia campaign. Both sides of this comment section have accounts that show signs of automated activity.

## 6.3 Name vs. Content Identity Analysis

When an account's name script does not match its comment language or content, it can suggest the account is trying to appear to belong to a different group. The following patterns were found:

## Thai-Named Accounts — Transparent, Not Hiding

All 26 accounts with Thai-script names post anti-Cambodia or anti-Hun Manet content — zero post Pro-Cambodia content. They do not appear to be hiding their identity. Their Thai names are consistent with their anti-Cambodia stance. Notable examples:

- "คน หลังฉาก" (meaning: "person behind the scenes"): the most active single account (5 posts, 19 total likes). All posts are in English, substantive, and focused on alleged links between Hun Sen's family and scam operations.
- "เขมร ต่ำ" Thai-script name meaning "inferior Khmer": a deeply offensive and derogatory label for Cambodians, chosen as a public account name. Content: anti-Cambodia criticism in English.
- "ศูนย์เซนเตอร์" ("Hun Sen Centre"): mocking name. The comment is written in Vietnamese not Khmer, not English: so it falls outside this analysis (classified as Unclassifiable).
- "ขุน ห้วยแม่ต้า" posted one Thai-language comment with 13 likes: "นักแสดงรางวัลตุ๊กตาทอง" meaning "Golden Doll Award-winning actor" mocking Hun Manet as a performer rather than a leader.
- "ปล่อยเป็ย ปล่อยเป็ย" the phrase "release the twin" repeated twice is common for a personal name in Thai. This account posted in both Thai and English and is flagged as High Risk for automated posting (Section 5).

## Arabic+Japanese Hybrid Name — Possible Identity Masking

"مايا ساكورا الزهور العطرة" — this name combines Arabic ("maya of the fragrant flowers") with the Japanese word "sakura" (cherry blossom). The account posted 4 unique anti-Hun Manet comments in English only, with 0 likes. The cross-language name does not match any specific identity and may be an attempt to avoid being linked to a specific country.

## Natthakit Pa — Audience Targeting or Identity Masking?

The name "Natthakit" is a Thai name. This account posted anti-Cambodia comments in English. The same content was then translated into Khmer and posted again. This shows a clear pattern. The account wanted both English-speaking and Khmer-speaking readers to see the message. Writing in Khmer makes the content easier for Cambodians to read and believe. This is called audience targeting. The account did not try to hide that it is Thai. It simply made its message available in the Cambodian language to reach more readers.

## Latin-Named Accounts Posting in Khmer (184 posts)

184 posts are from accounts with names written in Latin letters. These accounts wrote comments in Khmer and supported Cambodia. There are two possible reasons. First, they may write in Khmer to reach Cambodian readers more easily. Second, they may be trying to look Cambodian even though their names suggest they are not. The data alone does not tell us which reason is true.

"AnonymousTH" (user ID: 61560383947074) uses the word "Anonymous" in its name. This is a deliberate choice to hide the account's real identity. The "TH" may suggest a link to Thailand, but this is not confirmed. The account posted "He's a PM. or an actor?" the single most-liked comment in the dataset (12 likes). Unlike the copied Pro-Cambodia comments, this appears to be an individual critical comment. However, the account deliberately chose not to reveal who it is.

## 7. Key Findings

### Finding 1: The Comment Section Was Used to Change the Subject

The main topic of the AFP article was scam centres in Cambodia. However, the most common comments were about a different topic: a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand. This is a technique called "topic flooding" filling a post with off-topic messages to push out genuine discussion. The comment section should not be read as a reflection of public opinion on the scam centre issue.

### Finding 2: Almost 80% of Comments Were Copied

In a normal online discussion, fewer than 5% of comments are exact copies of each other. In this dataset, 79.8% are exact copies. This is strong evidence that the comments were produced by an organised group using a set of pre-written messages, not by independent members of the public sharing their own views.

### Finding 3: All Copies Appeared Within Two Hours

The commenting started slowly when the AFP post was published, then a massive wave arrived between 21:00 and 22:00 UTC — 814 comments in just one hour. After 23:00 UTC, numbers dropped to nearly zero. This pattern matches coordinated mass-posting, not natural public engagement.

### Finding 4: Computer Programs Were Used to Post

At least four accounts posted messages at speeds that are physically impossible for a human typist. Jee Naa posted the same 637-character message twice within 3 seconds (424.7 characters per second). Charntharn Lout posted two messages of about 1,880 characters each within 13 seconds (290.0 characters per second). The messages from Charntharn Lout also contain doubled words — a common sign of a script error in automated posting. Two more accounts — Tanawat Pangpan (42.1 chars/sec) and ปลออยเป็ย ปลออยเป็ย (56.3 chars/sec) — also posted at speeds far beyond what any person can type. These are strong signs that automated software tools were used.

### Finding 5 — Critical Voices Were Drowned Out

Only 71 comments (4.8%) were critical of Hun Manet or sceptical of the government's position. These comments appear genuine and individually written. They are far outnumbered by the copied Pro-Cambodia messages. A reader looking at the comment section would get a false picture of public opinion.

## 8. Recommendations

This section gives advice to different groups. Coordinated comment campaigns can affect any public Facebook page. Knowing what to do can help protect your page and your public communication.

### 8.1 For Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

- Save a copy of the comment section early. Facebook may remove or hide comments later. Screenshots and data exports are useful evidence.
- Count how many comments are exact copies. If more than 50% are the same text, this is a warning sign of a coordinated campaign.
- Look at the time pattern. If most comments arrive in a short burst — for example, hundreds in one hour. This is not natural behaviour.
- Do not use the number of comments to measure public opinion. A large number of comments does not mean large public support. The volume can be faked.
- Report large-scale coordinated campaigns to Meta using the platform's reporting tools. Document your report for your records.
- Share your findings publicly when it is safe to do so. Transparency helps the public understand what is happening online.

### 8.2 For Politicians and Public Figures

- Do not let a flood of copied comments push you to change your public position. These comments may not represent real public opinion.
- Before responding to online pressure, ask your team to check whether the comment section shows signs of coordination.
- If your page is targeted by a coordinated campaign, consider making a public statement. Explain what you found. This reduces the impact of the campaign.
- Keep records of all suspicious comment activity. Documented cases can be used as evidence for future accountability.
- Contact Meta's support channels if you believe your page is being targeted by inauthentic activity.

## 9. Methodology

Data: 1,489 comments were collected from AFP Facebook post ID 1343523617820612. Each record includes the comment text, user ID, username, like count, and posting timestamp.

Duplicate detection: Exact word-for-word matching was used. Any text that appeared in two or more rows was counted as a duplicate. Near-duplicate or paraphrased versions were not counted, so 79.8% is a conservative lower estimate — the real proportion of non-original content may be higher.

Hour trend: The created\_time column was converted to datetime format and grouped by hour to produce the comment-per-hour chart in Section 2.

Bot detection: For accounts with two or more posts, the time gap between consecutive posts was measured. The total character count of both posts was divided by the number of seconds to get a characters-per-second rate.

Limitations: This study is based only on public comment data. To confirm that specific accounts are fake, access to platform-level data (IP addresses, device information, account creation dates) would be needed. The findings here are strong indicators but should be treated as the basis for further investigation, not definitive conclusions.

Language note: Comments in languages other than English and Khmer were not analysed for sentiment and are placed in the Unclassifiable category. This means some viewpoints expressed in Thai, Arabic, or other languages are not captured in the sentiment breakdown.