

Cutting the Grass, Not the Root

*How Cambodia's Scam Compounds Kept Hiring Through the 2025–2026
Crackdown*

An investigative report based on 4,991 job ads posted to Telegram, April 2023 – July 2026

September 2026

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1. Introduction: Two Job Ads and What They Really Say

On the afternoon of July 16, 2026, a Telegram channel that advertises jobs in Cambodia posted a new job ad. It was short and clear.

We're hiring women staff. Position: Model real face. Language: English 90%. Salary start: \$4,000 – \$6,000. Day off: 2–4 days/month. Free food & accommodation. Single room for model stay. Working hours: 12h (break 2h). Nightshift. Nationality: Philippines – Myanmar – No Khmer. Interview with online video. Market: Europe. Location: Poipet, Cambodia. [ad 7726]

At first sight, it looks like a modelling job with very good pay. However, if you read it slowly, almost every line means something different.

To begin with, "Model real face" is not a modelling job. In the scam industry, a "Model" is the person who appears on a video call with a victim. The victim has been chatting online with someone for weeks. Then, when the victim becomes suspicious and asks for a video call, the "Model" is the real face that proves the online friend is a real person. A "Model real face" uses her own face, whereas a "Model AI" uses a computer program that puts her face over another face, so that one woman can play many different people.

Next, "Market: Europe" does not mean the company sells anything in Europe. In these ads, "Market" is the word for the victims, so "Market: Europe" means the victims are in Europe. The two largest markets in these ads are Europe and the USA.

The ad does not say why the shift is twelve hours at night, but the time difference explains it. Poipet is five to six hours ahead of most of Europe. As a result, a worker on the night shift in Poipet is awake during the afternoon and evening in Europe, which is when a person at home is most likely to answer a video call.

Similarly, "English 90%" and "Philippines – Myanmar – No Khmer" mean the company wants a foreign woman who can speak good English. She must be able to talk to a stranger in a language that is not her own, and she must also be far from home. "Single room for model stay" sounds like a benefit, but in a scam compound it means she lives where she works. In the end, the one thing the ad does not describe is the job itself.

Three months earlier, on April 12, 2026, a different channel posted an ad for Sihanoukville. April was the month the Government said the scam problem would be resolved.

Original post (Chinese), ad 6736

欧美面孔模特:

真人模特:

哪个国籍: 欧美面孔

模特年龄: 30岁以下

需要语言: 英文

薪资待遇: 3500u

工作时间: 22:00-10:00

月休几天: 4天

盘口市场: 欧美市场

公司要求: 瘦的, 脸小的

宿舍: 单间

用餐: 包

Translation by the investigation

European/American face model:

Real model:

Nationality: European/American
appearance

Model age: Under 30 years old

Required language: English

Salary: 3500 USDT

Working hours: 22:00–10:00

Days off per month: 4 days

Target market: US/Europe market

Company requirements: Slim, small face

Dormitory: Single room

Meals: Included

This ad is for the American market as well as the European one, and it wants a woman with a Western face. The salary is paid in USDT, a cryptocurrency, not in dollars. The shift, from 10 p.m. to 10 a.m. in Cambodia, is daytime in the United States. Finally, the line "Slim, small face" says what the job really is: it is about how she looks on a screen.

These two ads are not unusual. They are two of 4,991 job ad postings that this investigation collected from 37 Telegram channels and groups that advertise work in Cambodia, over more than three years. Together they contain 3,672 different ads, many of them posted more than once. These two are also among the most recent. Cambodia's Government said its crackdown on the scam industry would be finished by April 2026, and if the compounds were closed, there would be nothing to hire for. Yet the ads are still there. In other words, the Government says the compounds are gone, but the ads show that the grass was cut and the root is still there.

This report is therefore about what these ads say, who they are looking for, where they are pointing, and why they are still there.

2. Executive Summary

In July 2025, Cambodia's Government began a crackdown on scam compounds, and in April 2026 it set a deadline for them to close. Then, on 27 August 2026, the Government told foreign diplomats that "there are currently no online scam compounds remaining in the country."

This report checks that claim by reading the job ads. From April 2023 to July 2026, we collected 4,991 job postings from 37 public Telegram channels and groups that advertise work in Cambodia. That dataset

ends before the August statement, so the statement was checked separately, by reading five of the channels for 18 days after it (Section 6). The recruiters write these ads themselves, in Khmer, Chinese and English, and they say what the job is, how much it pays, who the company wants and where the work is. In other words, the ads are public, and anyone can read them.

What the ads offer

The most common job is "Add Contact," in which the worker finds people online and starts a conversation with them, for \$600 to \$750 a month. The second is "Model," in which a woman shows her face on video calls to a person in another country; it pays much more, \$4,000 to \$5,000 a month, and up to \$7,000 for a woman with a Western face. Other titles include "Customer Service," "Killer" (the person who takes the victim's money), translator, HR and finance.

The ads are also clear about who they want. Of the ads that state a preference, 947 ask for women and only 160 ask for men, and Model ads ask for a woman 85 per cent of the time. They ask for English, a typing speed and an age between 18 and 35, and many name a nationality, such as Filipino, Indian or Myanmar, while some say "No Khmer." In return, half offer food and a place to live, and for Models, 31 per cent promise a single room. However, where the ads give a shift with a start and an end time, the usual shift is twelve hours, 84 per cent are twelve hours or longer, and the usual number of days off is two a month. Twenty-seven ads even say the company will keep the worker's passport. Finally, the most common "Market", the country whose people the worker will target, is the United States, followed by Europe, India, Japan and Korea, and then Australia and New Zealand.

What happened after the shutdown

The ads did not stop. In April 2026, the month of the deadline, recruiters posted 431 ads for sites in Cambodia, which was the second-busiest month in three years. In Poipet, for example, the ads fell after police raids in May but were back to 67 a month by July, one of them for a "Newly opened company." Meanwhile, while old channels and groups went quiet or disappeared, recruiters were opening new ones: of the 29 channels and groups with a known creation date, 13 were created after the crackdown began. The same channels then began to advertise the same jobs in Malaysia, Dubai, Laos and Myanmar, targeting the same countries. Moreover, where an ad carries a map pin, four times out of five it sits within 500 metres of a compound that Amnesty International had already identified.

At the same time, the Government charged its own officials. Border police were removed for bringing people across the border, two immigration generals were arrested for taking bribes from scammers, 54 police officers were charged with breaking into a raided casino to steal the evidence, and three Foreign Ministry officials were charged over 6,000 visas used by foreigners in online fraud. Even so, in the 18 days after the Government said no compounds remained, five of the channels posted 59 ads for sites in Poipet, Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh and Pailin. One of these 59 ads was the Poipet ad quoted at the start of this report. It was posted again on 12 September, with the same words.

Conclusion

The evidence in this report leads to one conclusion. A raid can close a building, but it cannot stop the recruitment. The four cases the Government itself has charged show why: the system that was meant to

close the compounds was compromised: according to the Government's own charges, border police who let workers in, officials who gave them visas, and police who led raids were paid by the scam industry. In addition, some of the recruiters' channels and groups are still active on Telegram today. Telegram has not removed them, and there is no sign that the Government has asked it to. For these reasons, the crackdown has cut the grass but left the root in the ground. The compounds may have changed their names or moved to new buildings, but the hiring never stopped, and it is still going on today. Section 11 sets out the author's two concerns about where this leads: the industry is now being copied in the countries its workers came from, and scam work is becoming, for the people who take it, an ordinary job.

PART I: Inside the Job Ads: What Cambodia's Scam Compounds Offer, and Who They Want

3. The Advertised Jobs and What Each Job Does

This report counts postings, because many ads were posted more than once, in the same channel or in several. As a result, the 4,991 postings contain 3,672 different ads (see Section 12). Of the 4,991 postings, 4,822 name a job. Most of the names sound ordinary: Customer Service, Call Center, Translator, Model, Accountant, HR. A person looking for work would not see anything strange. However, the ads also explain, in their own words, what each job does. Put together, the jobs fall into three groups: jobs that talk to victims, jobs that move money, and jobs that keep the company running.

The ads treat these jobs as one set. In June 2025, a recruitment agency posted a list of the staff it could supply to any company: *"Lead Generation – Lead Reception/Add Contact – Customer Service – Deposit/Withdrawal – Translator – Model – Call Operator."* [ad 346] The same agency offered them all, to the same clients.

Jobs That Talk to the Victims

Add Contact is the biggest job in the ads. It appears in 1,199 of them, almost one in four. The worker's task is to find people online and start a chat. The ads say where: *"Find customers on Telegram."* [ad 1348] *"Find clients via INS, TikTok, FB."* [ad 1832] *"Find clients via SIM platform USA"* [ad 7251], which means sending text messages to American phone numbers. One ad posted on June 20, 2026, for home-based work in Cambodia, explains the tools: for a deposit of \$200, the company sends *"1 computer, 15 mobile phones, and SIM cards."* [ad 7251] Pay is low, usually \$600 to \$750 a month, but 107 of the ads add a payment for each person the worker finds. The usual form is a daily target with a bonus above it: *"Find only 5 clients per day; exceeding target pays \$1 per person."* [ad 1895] Others offer \$2 or \$3 per customer, or \$1 for each person moved onto WhatsApp.

Customer Service appears in 772 ads, but it is not the same job as Add Contact. The ads are clear about this: *"Easy work, no need to find customers, no pressure. Note: Gaming Platform."* [ad 1813] The Customer Service worker answers people who are already on the company's "platform" (usually an online gambling site, sometimes a cryptocurrency or "mining" site), replying to their chats and handling their deposits and withdrawals. A typical ad reads: *"Position: Customer Service, replying to customer chats (Platform Game). Salary: \$600 – \$800 + \$100. English 30% – 40%. Typing 30 wpm up."* [ad 236] These gambling platforms

target different countries from the video-call scams. India, the Philippines, Thailand and Brazil appear most often. One survivor's story in our documents shows what this job title can lead to. A Ugandan man told the BBC his work followed a script: *"You build trust, and then later on you can lure them into buying the products."*¹ Pay in the ads is \$800 to \$1,075 a month.

Model is the second-largest job: 1,078 ads, including 836 for a "Model Real" or "Live Model" and 138 for a "Model AI." The Model is the face on the video call. When a victim asks to see the person they have been chatting with, the Model appears on camera. The ads describe the duties simply, *"Appear on camera, video calls"* [ad 6651], and ask applicants to say which kind they are: *"Real face or AI: Real person."* [ad 6651] WIRED, in a review of Telegram job ads that this investigation also collected, found that "AI face models" sit at a computer making deepfake video calls, sometimes a hundred a day.² A survivor told the BBC that workers used AI *"to transform their voices and appearance."*³ Models are paid far more than anyone else: usually \$4,000 to \$5,000 a month, and up to \$7,000 for a woman with a Western face.

Call Center appears in 403 ads. Some of these workers make ordinary sales calls, but some do not. One ad asks for *"experience with police, prosecution, or judicial phone lines."* [ad 5243] Another describes the duty as *"Make phone calls regarding law enforcement and judicial officials."* [ad 4820] These are calls in which the worker pretends to be a police officer or a court official. The Guardian, visiting a seized compound on the Thai border, found rooms built to look like police offices, with uniforms, badges, and *"scripts to be read over the phone to victims."*⁴ Pay is \$1,000 to \$1,200 a month for most, rising to \$7,000 for German or Spanish speakers.

Killer is a job title in only 23 ads, but the word matters. It is the industry's own name for the worker who gets the victim to pay. An ad for Sihanoukville reads: *"Position: Killer. English 30%. Typing 20+. Salary: \$750 + Commission."* [ad 1748] The commission matters. The Killer earns money when the victim loses money. WIRED found the same word used by workers themselves: one applicant described *"3 year as customer service (killer) of scamming platform crypto."*⁵ No document in this investigation defines the word. Its meaning comes from how it is used.

Jobs That Move the Victims' Money

Withdrawal and **Deposit & Withdrawal** workers, in 27 ads, handle money going in and out of the "platform", the investment or gambling website the victim has been sent to. **Money Mule** and **Money Exchange** workers, in 81 ads, lend their own bank accounts. A set of ads for Istanbul says it plainly: *"4–5 bank accounts are sufficient. We do not want crypto accounts. We have you withdraw cash from the bank for whatever comes to your IBAN."* [ad 6009] The pay is 70,000 Turkish lira a day. The UN human rights

¹BBC, "BBC goes inside a seized Cambodian scam compound."

²WIRED, "'100 Video Calls Per Day': Models Are Applying to Be the Face of AI Scams" (2026).

³BBC, "BBC goes inside a seized Cambodian scam compound."

⁴The Guardian, "Fake rooms, props and a script to lure victims: inside an abandoned Cambodia scam centre."

⁵WIRED, "'100 Video Calls Per Day': Models Are Applying to Be the Face of AI Scams" (2026).

office has recorded victims of trafficking being forced to become "*money mules*" and open bank accounts in the same way.⁶


Jobs That Keep the Company Running

Translators (435 ads, \$2,000 to \$3,000 a month) work between Chinese managers and local staff; the ads describe the job as "*collaborate with management to manage Cambodian staff.*" [ad 2105] **Bloggers, Live Streamers** and **Live Lottery Hosts** make content to pull people onto gambling sites. **Accountants, HR staff, Receptionists** and **Admin** workers (166 ads) are the ordinary staff of an ordinary company. And a handful of **Recruiters** and **Scouts** find the next models.

A few ads hire for the technology itself. Every "Model AI" job needs software that puts one face over another on a video call, and someone has to build it. In March and April 2026, one of the busiest channels for Cambodian-site ads posted, twice, an ad for "*AI model developers*" for a company in Vietnam, at 3,000 to 4,000 Chinese yuan a month [ads 5709, 5723]. The ad does not say what the AI is for. But the same recruiter posted it between ads for Model and Add Contact jobs in Poipet, and that is why it is here. Other ads show the tools in use: a Phnom Penh company hiring call operators at \$4,000 a month describes the job as "*Using AI to make phone calls*" [ad 7206], and a Chrey Thom ad wants a man "*with a beard*" for "*AI video calls*" [ad 4314]. In other words, the compounds are not only using AI. They are hiring the people who build and run it.

In summary, the three largest jobs, Add Contact, Model and Customer Service, are all jobs that talk to a victim. Together they are 61 per cent of all the ads. More than anything else, the compounds are hiring people to talk.

⁶UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), A "Wicked Problem": Seeking Human Rights-Based Solutions to Trafficking into Cyber-Scam Operations in South-East Asia.



Dark bars: the three stages of contact with a victim. 169 ads (3.4%) do not name a job and are not shown.

Figure 3.1. Number of job ads by job title, out of 4,991 ads. Dark bars are the three jobs that talk to victims.

Table 1. The jobs in the ads: how many, what they pay, what they do, and where the explanation comes from.

Job title (as written in the ads)	Ads	Salary offered (USD / month)	What the job does	Source of the explanation
Add Contact	1,199	\$600 – \$750, plus \$1–\$3 per customer found in 107 ads	Finds people online and starts the chat on Telegram, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or SMS. Paid per person found above a daily target.	Ads: "Find clients via SIM platform USA"; "Find customers on Telegram"; "15 mobile phones and SIM cards"; "Find only 5 clients per day; exceeding target pays \$1 per person"
Model (Real 836 / AI 138 / unspecified 104)	1,078	\$4,000 – \$5,000 (up to \$7,000 for Western faces)	The face on the video call that proves the online friend is real. AI versions put her face over another.	Ads: "Appear on camera, video calls"; "Real face or AI: Real person". WIRED: AI face models make deepfake video calls. BBC survivor: AI used "to transform their voices and appearance"
Customer Service (+49 CS & Withdrawal)	772	\$800 – \$1,075	Replies to customers already on the company's "platform" (usually an online gambling site) and handles their deposits and withdrawals. Not the same job as Add Contact.	Ads: "no need to find customers"; "replying to customer chats (Platform Game)"; "Deposits and withdrawals, and responding to customer service inquiries". BBC survivor: "You build trust, and then later on you can lure them into buying the products"
Translator	435	\$2,000 – \$3,000	Chinese ↔ Khmer / English / Thai. Often supervises local staff for Chinese managers.	Ads: "Collaborate with management to manage Cambodian staff"; "Supervise employee work status"

Job title (as written in the ads)	Ads	Salary offered (USD / month)	What the job does	Source of the explanation
Call Center	403	\$1,000 – \$1,200 (up to \$7,000 for German / Spanish speakers)	Phone calls to victims, including impersonating police or officials.	Ads: "Make phone calls regarding law enforcement and judicial officials"; "experience with police, prosecution, or judicial phone lines". Guardian: fake police offices and "scripts to be read over the phone to victims"
Money Mule / Money Exchange	81	70,000 Turkish lira per day (Istanbul ads); no USD monthly figure	Lends bank accounts and withdraws the victims' money as cash.	Ads: "4–5 bank accounts are sufficient... withdraw cash from the bank for whatever comes to your IBAN". UN OHCHR: victims forced "to become 'money mules' and to open bank accounts"
Withdrawal / Deposit & Withdrawal	27	\$700 – \$1,350	Moves money in and out of the investment or gambling "platform".	Ads: "Withdrawal Department"; "Gaming Platform"
Killer	23	\$700 – \$1,000 + commission	The worker who gets the victim to pay. The word is the industry's own.	Ad: "Position: Killer ... \$750 + Commission". WIRED applicant: "3 year as customer service (killer) of scamming platform crypto"
Blogger / Live Streamer / Live Lottery Host	79	\$800 – \$1,500	Makes content or streams to draw people to gambling sites.	Ads: "Live Lottery Sales"; "good at live-stream sales"; "Blogger (Online Casino – No scam)"
Back office: Accountant 59, HR 50, Receptionist 34, Finance 16, Admin 7	166	\$800 – \$1,000	Ordinary company support roles.	Ads: titles only
Recruiter / Scout	24	\$1,000 – \$4,500	Finds models and staff; agencies exist.	Ads: "Model Scout / Online Recruiter"; agency ad listing the full set of roles
(Job not named)	169	–	–	–

Salary = median of the stated minimum to median of the stated maximum across all ads for that role. Medians are used so that a few unusual offers do not pull the figure up or down. Salaries stated in other currencies are not included. Sources named in the last column are all documents collected by this investigation: WIRED, BBC, The Guardian, and the UN Human Rights Office.


4. The Kind of Worker the Recruiters Are Looking For

A job ad tells you two things: what the job is, and who the company wants to do it. The ads are short, but they are exact about who they want. They state a gender, an age range, a language level, a typing speed, and sometimes a nationality or a kind of face.

Gender: Six Women Asked For, for Every Man

Most ads do not say whether they want men or women. However, of the 2,294 that do, the pattern is clear. 947 ads ask for women, either "Female only" or "Female preferred." 160 ask for men. That is six women asked for, for every man. The remaining 1,187 say "all genders."

The demand for women is mostly in one job. For Model, 435 ads ask for a woman and 51 for a man. Only 25 say "all genders." In other words, when a Model ad states a preference (and most do), it asks for a woman 85 per cent of the time. No other job comes close. Call Center ads are split evenly between "female" and "all genders." Add Contact and Customer Service ads mostly say "all genders." In short, the jobs that need a face on camera want women, while the jobs that need typing do not care.



Ads that do not state a gender are excluded (2,697 of 4,991). n = ads stating a gender for that job.

Figure 4.1. Gender preference by job, among the 2,294 ads that state one. Model is the only job where "all genders" almost never appears.

Age: 18 to 35, and Under 30 for Models

706 ads give an age range. The most common is 18 to 35, followed by 18 to 30. In 562 of the 706 ads, the youngest age accepted is 18. In 279, the oldest is 30 or under. Model ads use the narrowest ranges: "Model age: Under 30 years old." [ad 5608] "Age: 23–30 year." [ad 7639] "Age 18–35." [ad 7813]

English, Measured in Percentages

English is required or preferred in 2,731 ads, more than half. Chinese comes second, in 1,107. The ads have their own way of stating the level. They give it as a percentage: "English 20%." [ad 7823] "English 30% – 40%." [ad 679] "English 90%." [ad 4640] 1,096 ads use this scale. The median is 30 per cent. It rises with the job: Add Contact ads usually ask for 30 per cent, Customer Service 40 per cent, Call Center and Translator 60 per cent, and Model ads 80 per cent. A worker who chats by text needs less English than one who must speak on a phone or a video call.

Typing Speed: 25 to 30 Words a Minute

1,714 ads state a typing speed. The usual demand is 25 or 30 words per minute. It is the one skill test in almost every Add Contact and Customer Service ad. It shows what the work is: typing to strangers for the whole shift.

Nationality: Who the Ads Want, and "No Khmer"

332 ads have a "Nationality" line. Khmer or Cambodian is the most common (107 ads), then "any nationality" (60), Filipino (52), Indian (46), Myanmar (37), Pakistani (23), Vietnamese (20). The nationality follows the market. Customer Service ads for the India gambling platforms ask for Indian, Nepali and Bangladeshi workers. Model ads ask for Filipino and Myanmar women, and, in 22 cases, for a woman with a European or American face: *"European/American appearance."* [ad 4357] Twenty-two ads say something unusual for a job ad in Cambodia: *"No Khmer."* [ad 7647]

Appearance: What the Model Ads Ask For

Model ads describe the face they want. Of 253 Model ads written in English, 105 mention appearance. The common words are "face," "appearance," and "look," but some are more direct: *"Skin: White."* [ad 7689] *"Good looking, highly cooperative."* [ad 4370] *"Slim, small face."* [ad 5608] Four ads from early 2026 use the title *"Model Real (Sexy)."* [ad 4367] The ads almost never ask for height and weight. WIRED found those questions in the video applications that women send in reply.⁷

Experience: What Kind the Ads Require

349 ads require it. 264 say none is needed, and many promise training. The ads that ask for experience are often specific about what kind: *"Must have experienced of cryptocurrency or stock."* [ad 6114] *"Experience finding clients via Telegram."* [ad 7556] *"Experience with police, prosecution, or judicial phone lines."* [ad 5243]

Put together, the ads describe the worker they want. For the jobs that type, it is a person of any gender, over 18, with 30 per cent English and 25 words a minute. For the job on camera, it is a woman under 30, with good English, from the Philippines or Myanmar or with a Western face, who lives where she works.

5. What the Ads Offer on Top of the Salary

The first half of a job ad says what the job is and who should apply. The second half says what the worker gets. In these ads, the second half is long. It covers salary, food, a bed, bonuses and days off. It also covers something ordinary job ads never mention: whether the worker will be allowed to leave.

The Salary, Job by Job

Table 1 gives the pay for each job. The pattern is simple. Jobs that type earn the least: Add Contact \$600 to \$750 a month, Customer Service \$800 to \$1,075. Jobs that speak earn more: Call Center \$1,000 to \$1,200, Translator \$2,000 to \$3,000. The job that shows a face earns the most: Model \$4,000 to \$5,000, and up to \$7,000 for a woman with a Western face. The highest offers of all, however, are for people who speak a rare language. A *"Japanese Female Call Operator"* in Chrey Thom is offered \$8,000 to \$12,000 a month [ad 4423]. A Korean-speaking *"Real Face"* model in Malaysia is offered \$10,000 to \$12,000, with *"Food, Room, Ticket and Visa."* [ad 6663]

Food, Housing, Bonuses and Commission

⁷WIRED, "'100 Video Calls Per Day': Models Are Applying to Be the Face of AI Scams" (2026).

Half the ads (48 per cent) offer food, and half (50 per cent) offer a place to live. These two usually come together: *"Free food & accommodation."* [ad 2740] *"Provides 3 meals."* [ad 4150] *"Accommodation and \$240 food allowance."* [ad 177] For Models, the ads go further: 31 per cent promise a single room. *"Have single room for model stay."* [ad 7641] *"Dormitory: Single room."* [ad 3518]

A quarter of the ads (26 per cent) offer commission. For Add Contact, it is a payment per person found. For Killer, it is a share of what the victim pays. Thirteen per cent offer an attendance bonus for coming to work every day. Ten per cent set out a schedule of raises: *"Salary: \$700 (+\$50 every 3 months)"* [ad 1822]. *"Increases \$100/month up to \$700"* [ad 2353]. Some ads add smaller things, such as a taxi to the interview, a visa or a flight, and one channel of ads offers *"Fruit juice distributed once a week"* [ad 2776].




Figure 5.1. What the ads offer on top of salary, as a share of all 4,991 ads. Red bars are promises about the worker's freedom to leave.

Days off, and money for not taking them

3,115 ads state how many days off a worker gets each month. The most common answer is two. 723 ads offer one day. 778 offer four. And 295 ads offer money instead: a payment for not taking the day off at all. *"Day off: 1 day (No day off + \$100)."* [ad 1839] *"2 days off per month, if not taken get \$100."* [ad 1813] The usual amounts are \$50 or \$100. A worker who takes no rest for a month earns an extra \$100.

Working Hours: Twelve-Hour Shifts

2,448 ads give a shift with a start and an end time. The median shift is twelve hours. Eighty-four per cent of the shifts are twelve hours or longer. *"Working hours: 12h (Break 2h)."* [ad 7641] *"4:00 PM – 4:00 AM."* [ad 4122] *"22:00–10:00."* [ad 1169]

The Freedom Question: Passports and Leaving the Building

This is where these ads differ from every other kind of job ad. 27 ads say the company will keep the worker's passport: *"1 year contract, collect Passport."* [ad 4628] *"Requirements for staying at a passport collection company."* [ad 4173] But 15 ads promise the opposite, in strong words:

"Your passport and cellphone will NOT be held ... You're free to go WHENEVER you want."
[ad 1681]

"My company No passport collection No contract No free visa (freedom 100%)" [ad 4664]

"With or without passport, we don't care. The company does not restrict freedom. Welcome." [ad 5292]

Another 344 ads advertise that the worker is "free to enter and exit" [ad 4037], and 532 say the worker "can live outside" [ad 7830]. A normal job ad does not promise that you may leave the building. These ads promise it because the people reading them know that, in this industry, many workers cannot. Only 38 ads say the opposite openly: "cannot live outside" [ad 330]. But the silence of the other ads matters too. For Model ads, only 5 per cent mention living outside at all.

Taken together, the package is made for a worker who arrives with nothing and stays. Food, a bed, and a room are provided so that the worker does not need to go out. Bonuses reward attendance. Money is offered instead of rest. And the one promise that would matter most, that the worker may leave, is made in only 15 ads out of 4,991.

PART II: Why Recruitment Survived the Crackdown

6. Cutting the Grass: The Crackdown and What the Job Ads Did During It

On 4 July 2025, the Cambodian Government issued a nine-point order for a national campaign against online scams. It was signed by Prime Minister Hun Manet. It told provincial governors, the police, border officials, the courts and the gambling commission to act.⁸ The raids started the same month. By the end of July, the Government said it had raided nearly 140 locations and arrested more than 3,000 people from

⁸Royal Government of Cambodia, Order for the Campaign to Crack Down on Online Scams, 4 July 2025, signed by Prime Minister Hun Manet; reported in Khmer Times, "Royal Government Issues 9-point Order," July 2025. Cited in Amnesty International, Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims It Has Failed, Index ASA 23/1093/2026, June 2026, p. 27.

at least 19 countries.⁹ By December, the Government's own commission counted 118 raids and 4,983 arrests.¹⁰

In February 2026 the campaign was given a new name and a deadline. The Ministry of Interior called it the "XXL elimination" of online scams. The spokesperson said the country would be cleaned up by Khmer New Year, in April 2026.¹¹ On 26 February, Senior Minister Chhay Sinarith said: *"The problem of online scams has fallen to just 50%."*¹² The Prime Minister told a news agency the same week that the scam networks were *"destroying our honest economy"* and *"we need to clean this out."*¹³

The Government kept publishing numbers. Nearly 6,000 arrests in two months, the Government said in March; 236 scam sites shut down, including 91 in casinos.¹⁴ On 1 April, the Senior Minister reported 750 prosecutions and 11,000 deportations since July.¹⁵ Three weeks later, on 23 April, the Prime Minister ordered the crackdown to continue all year, and the Government published its results: action taken against more than 250 online scam cases, 112 cases in court, 1,089 suspects, 13,039 foreigners deported.¹⁶

The raids were real. In Banteay Meanchey province, the ruling party's website reported operations at eight locations in and around Poipet between late March and mid-July 2026, including a twelve-storey building and a 52-room hotel, with more than 4,000 foreigners detained. On 3 May 2026, a provincial task force entered three more sites in Poipet city and found 185 undocumented foreigners, 154 of them Indonesian.¹⁷

That is what the Government reported. However, two months after the deadline, in June 2026, Amnesty International published its count. It found 86 scam compounds operating in Cambodia at the end of April 2026, up from 53 a year earlier. It found evidence of a police intervention at only 24 of them.¹⁸ A researcher at a Washington policy institute told Bloomberg that the raids looked "performative", meaning

⁹Channel News Asia, "Commentary: Cambodia vows to get rid of scam compounds – but large operators are left untouched," 10 August 2025. Cited in Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims It Has Failed*, Index ASA 23/1093/2026, June 2026.

¹⁰Secretariat of the Commission for Combating Online Scams (CCOS), report, December 2025. Cited in Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims It Has Failed*, Index ASA 23/1093/2026, June 2026.

¹¹Cambodianess, "Cambodia's 'XXL' Scam Crackdown Targets Thousands," February 2026; Khmer Post USA, "Cambodia Vows to Eliminate Online Scams by April 2026," 5 February 2026. Cited in Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims It Has Failed*, Index ASA 23/1093/2026, June 2026.

¹²The Straits Times, "Cambodia Claims Its Crackdown Has Halved Online Scam Activity," 26 February 2026. Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims It Has Failed*, Index ASA 23/1093/2026, June 2026 notes: "No evidence was made available to substantiate the claim."

¹³Agence France-Presse, "Scam centres 'destroying' Cambodia's economy, PM tells AFP," 25 February 2026, via France 24.

¹⁴The Cambodia Daily, "Cambodia cracks down on online scams with nearly 6,000 arrests in two months," 19 March 2026; Agence Kampuchea Presse, "Cambodia Intensifies Crackdown on Online Scams, 50 Suspects Arrested in Sihanoukville," 24 March 2026.

¹⁵Ministry of Information, Cambodia, "Cambodia Cracks Down on Cybercrime: 750 Suspected Scammers Prosecuted, 11,000 Foreigners Deported," 1 April 2026.


¹⁶Khmer Times, "PM Orders Year Round Crackdown on Online Scams Amid Major Enforcement Results," 23 April 2026.

¹⁷Cambodian People's Party, provincial report for Banteay Meanchey, 24 March – 14 July 2026, cpp.org.kh/details/462166.

¹⁸Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims It Has Failed*, Index ASA 23/1093/2026, June 2026.

done for show, with operators warned before the police arrived, and that compounds were moving from large border sites to smaller buildings in cities, or leaving the country. An Interpol analyst said: *"Has the crackdown led to an end? It does not appear so."*¹⁹

The Telegram job ads say the same thing, in numbers.



*July 2026 covers July 1–20 only (end of data collection). Earlier months (April 2023 – June 2025) averaged about 12 ads a month and are not shown; see Section 12.

Figure 6.1. Job ads per month on the 37 channels and groups, July 2025 – July 2026, as postings (solid) and as distinct ads with reposts removed (dashed). The four Government dates are marked. July 2026 covers 1–20 July only.

The Ads Did Not Slow Down During the Crackdown

The channels and groups in this dataset posted 394 job ads in February 2026, the month the minister said the industry had been cut in half. They posted 343 in March. In April, the month the problem was supposed to be over, they posted 562, one of the three busiest months in three years of data. From 1 May to 20 July 2026, after the deadline had passed, they posted another 1,059. July alone produced 588 in twenty days. When reposted ads are removed, the picture is the same: 421 different ads in April, 710 from May to July.

Not all of these ads were for Cambodia; Section 7 returns to that. But 414 of the post-deadline ads were: 174 for Phnom Penh, 131 for Sihanoukville, 93 for Poipet, and a few for Koh Kong and Bavet. Each one is a job at a site the Government says it has dealt with.

Poipet, month by month

Poipet is the clearest test, because the raids there are the best recorded. On 2 April 2026, in the last month before the deadline, a Poipet channel advertised for *"Indian Chat Operators"* at the *"Dynasty / Vegas Casino"*: \$800 a month plus commission, 11 a.m. to 1 a.m., six workers to a room, one-year contract, *"valid*

¹⁹Philip J. Heijmans and Rosalind Mathieson, "Cambodia scam centers increase despite crackdown, report says," Bloomberg, June 2026, quoting Julia Dickson (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and Stephanie Baroud (INTERPOL).

visa holders only" [ad 5364]. That month, the channels posted 274 ads for Poipet. Then came the 3 May raids. In May, Poipet ads fell to 11. In June, 15.

The first Poipet ad after the raids appeared on 7 May 2026, four days later: a Khmer-language ad for a "Model AI" who speaks Chinese, \$4,000 a month, four days off, single room and food [ad 6794]. On 11 May, another wanted a female "AI Model" with Japanese at native level, for \$6,000 to \$7,000 a month, in "Poipet City" [ad 7904]. On 17 June, another ad wanted Add Contact staff of Chinese nationality for a night shift, "With or without passport," in a "Hotel office + Hotel accommodation," one day off a month, one-year contract [ad 7235]. By July, Poipet ads had climbed back to 67. One, posted on 19 July, began: "Newly opened company" [ad 7801]. Part of the May fall may be because some channels went quiet, or because fewer posts were collected. The recovery, though, came from the same channels. A raid stopped Poipet's recruitment for about two months. It did not end it.




Figure 6.2. Job ad postings for Poipet, January to July 2026. The 3 May 2026 police raids are marked. July covers 1–20 July only.

The channels grew during the crackdown

Of the 29 channels and groups whose creation date is known, 13 were created in or after July 2025, that is, after the crackdown began. On one day, 17 September 2025, one operator created four channels and groups at once, one each for Sihanoukville, Chrey Thom, Bavet and Phnom Penh. Three more appeared together on 26 October 2025. Channels and groups also disappeared during the crackdown: 25 of the 37 stopped posting or were removed, most of them between January and April 2026. The data cannot say whether Telegram removed them, the operators closed them, or they simply went quiet. But the 12 that remained posted 588 ads in the first twenty days of July.




Figure 6.3. The 37 channels and groups, one line each, from creation date (or first post, where the creation date is unknown) to last post. Dark lines were still posting in July 2026; grey lines had stopped or been removed. The crackdown start (July 2025) and the deadline (April 2026) are marked. No channel or group is named.

What this data can and cannot show

Two limits should be clear.

First, this report cannot say that recruitment went up because of the crackdown. The reason is simple. Before July 2025, very few ads were collected, about 12 a month. After July 2025, collection became much fuller. So the big jump in the chart is partly a change in how much was collected, not only a change in how much was posted. Comparing "before" with "after" would not be fair.

Second, this report counts ads, not buildings. An ad shows that someone is hiring for a site. It does not show how many sites there are.

What the data can show is smaller, but it is hard to deny. From February to July 2026, recruiters posted hundreds of ads every month for scam sites in Cambodia: before the deadline, during it, and after it. In Poipet, the ads stopped for about two months after the raids, then came back. And while old channels and groups disappeared, the recruiters were opening new ones.


Grass that has been cut looks, for a few weeks, like grass that is gone.

After the last claim

The main dataset of this report ends in July 2026. On 27 August 2026, the Government made a new claim. The senior minister in charge of the crackdown told foreign diplomats that the authorities had inspected 793 locations, shut down 624 sites, and detained nearly 30,000 people. The ministry's statement said: "Large-scale scam activities have been brought fully under control, and there are currently no online scam compounds remaining in the country." The same statement said that criminal groups had moved to "decentralized, small-scale activities, hiding in guesthouses, condominiums, rental houses, vehicles, and coffee shops."²⁰ The statement, as reported, did not name the 624 sites.

The July data cannot test an August claim. So we ran a small, separate test. We collected the posts from five of the twelve channels and groups that were still active in July, chosen among those that had posted the most ads for Cambodian sites, for the 18 days from 28 August to 14 September 2026. We read every post that named a place in Cambodia and removed the ones that were not compound-type jobs. Of the twelve channels and groups active in July, six were checked in September and all six were still posting; the other six were not checked. This test is smaller than the main dataset and was done by hand. Its numbers are kept separate from every other number in this report.

In those 18 days, the five channels and groups posted 306 job ads. Fifty-nine of them (28 different ad texts) were for sites in Cambodia, on 16 of the 18 days: Poipet 28, Sihanoukville 14, Phnom Penh 9, Pailin 3, Dara Sakor 2, Bavet 1, Siem Reap 1, and 4 that said only "Cambodia." They were the same jobs as Part I, in the same words. On 29 August, two days after the statement, a Chinese-language ad asked for a woman with a "European or American face" and good English, for "real face" work in Pailin, market "US stocks," \$5,000 to \$6,000, single room. It added: "Must live at the company: yes, allowed out twice a month," and "be obedient, easier to manage" [test ad 1596]. The same day, another ad asked for a "real-person on-camera model" with a "European or American face" for the "US stocks" market, 8:30 p.m. to 8 a.m., workplace Sihanoukville [test ad 1597]. Both were posted again in English two days later [test ads 1598, 1599]. On 12 September, the ad that opens this report (Poipet, "Model real face," "Market: Europe," "No Khmer") was posted again in the same channel, word for word [test ad 473287]. That was sixteen days after the Government said no compounds remained.



²⁰Nikkei Asia, "Cambodia claims to have eradicated all online scam compounds," 28 August 2026, reporting a Cambodian Information Ministry statement on a briefing to foreign diplomats by Senior Minister Chhay Sinarith on 27 August 2026.

Figure 6.4. Ads for sites in Cambodia posted in five channels and groups on each day from 28 August to 14 September 2026, after the Government said on 27 August that no online scam compounds remained. 59 postings in total.

The other 193 ads in those 18 days were for sites outside Cambodia: Malaysia 72, Myanmar 66, Laos 31, Pakistan 28, the Philippines 16, Vietnam 14, Thailand 10. This is the pattern Section 7 describes: the same channels, the same jobs, now for other countries. The Government's statement itself admits that the industry has "altered their tactics" and is "hiding" in small places. That is not a description of an industry that has ended. It is a description of an industry that has moved. And, as the 59 ads show, not all of it has moved.

Did the ads for Cambodia fall after the statement? In these five channels, yes. Compared with July, they posted fewer ads for Cambodian sites in the 18 days after the statement, about the level of June. But the channels themselves did not slow down. They posted about as many ads a day as they had in July. What changed was the country in the ad: more of the ads were for sites in Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos and Pakistan. A fall is not a stop. Ads for Cambodian sites still appeared on 16 of the 18 days.

This test cannot see inside a building. It can only read what the recruiters write. What they wrote, in the 18 days after the Government said no compounds remained, was: single room, live at the company, out twice a month, Poipet, Sihanoukville, Phnom Penh, Pailin.

7. Recruited Here, Working There, Targeting Somewhere Else

All 37 channels and groups in this dataset are about work in Cambodia. Their names are Cambodian place names (Poipet, Sihanoukville, Bavet, Phnom Penh) or simply "Job in Cambodia," and their posts are written in Khmer, with Chinese and English. Where the people who run them sit, Telegram does not show. However, many of the jobs they advertise are not in Cambodia, and the victims are usually in a third country. This section follows that chain: where the ad is posted, where the job is, who the victims are, and who the worker must be.

One ad shows the whole pattern. On 8 July 2026, a group about jobs in Cambodia posted this:

Position: Telephone operator. Model. Salary: 3000U–5000U. Monthly leave: 4 days. Gender: Female. Language: American English. Market: United States. Work contract: One year. Nationality requirements: European countries. Job duties: Video chatting, making phone calls. Working hours: Eight hours in US Western Time. Working location: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [ad 6961]

The ad is posted in a Cambodia group. The job is in Malaysia. The victims are in the United States, because the shift is set to "US Western Time." And the worker must be a woman with a European look. Four places, one job.

This ad is not the only one. Six days later the same group wanted a female "AI Model" for Islamabad, Pakistan: "Target Market: Asian Americans in the United States ... Nationality Requirement: Asian women. Job Description: Engage in conversations with clients about love and life." [ad 6985] On 20 July, the last day in the dataset, another channel wanted a "Real Model" for Myanmar: "Needs Russia and Ukraine. Must know only English ... Market: USA (Cryptocurrency)." [ad 7943] And from April to July, a group named

for the Cambodian town of Chrey Thom posted, again and again, an ad for Istanbul: *"4–5 bank accounts are sufficient ... We have you withdraw cash from the bank for whatever comes to your IBAN. Daily fixed payment 70,000 £."* [ad 6009]

Hop 1: Where the Jobs Are

Most ads are for Cambodia: Sihanoukville (1,287 ads), Bavet (917), Poipet (876), Phnom Penh (776), then Chrey Thom, Koh Kong, Tbong Khmum and six other provinces. But 829 ads, one in six, name a worksite in another country. Malaysia leads with 215, then Myanmar (168), the Golden Triangle zone in Laos (98), Turkey (74), China (68), Vietnam (62), Pakistan (43), the United Arab Emirates (26) and Sri Lanka (25). Another 50 are for work from home. The same channels and groups advertise both. A group named for Poipet will post a Poipet job in the morning and a Malaysia job in the afternoon.

Hop 2: Which Countries the Ads Target

Not every ad says who the victims are. But 1,162 do, and they show that the worksite and the "market" are two different places. Ads for Cambodian sites name the USA (243), Europe (168), India (127), Japan (99) and Korea (81), and, in 10 ads, Australia and New Zealand. Ads for Malaysian worksites point to the USA (40) and Europe (15). Ads for Myanmar worksites point to the USA (34) and Europe (25). Ads for Pakistan, the UAE and Sri Lanka point almost only to the USA. The Turkey ads are different: they are Money Mule jobs, and their "market" is Europe and cryptocurrency. Two ads, from two different countries, can be run by the same kind of company, aiming at the same kind of victim.




Figure 7.1. Two hops. Panel A (solid orange lines): ads posted in channels and groups about work in Cambodia, for a job in another country (829 ads). Panel B (dashed blue lines): from the country where the job is to the country the ads target, among ads that state a "Market." A thicker line means more ads. The legend in each panel explains the symbols.

Hop 3: What the Worker Must Look Like

The ads for foreign worksites often ask for a foreign worker too. Among those that state a nationality, the most common requests are Vietnamese (7), Indonesian, Chinese, Filipino and Myanmar workers. But twelve ads ask for something different: not a nationality, but a face. "Western-looking." [ad 6605] "Asian and European faces are both acceptable." [ad 6595] "Must have a Caucasian appearance (European or American)." [ad 6982] Two ads write "European/American countries" in the nationality line [ads 4393, 4399], but the other ten make the meaning clear: the ad wants a woman who looks European, whether or not she is. Twenty-two ads across the dataset say "No Khmer" [ad 7647]. A group about work in Cambodia is used to hire a woman with a European face, to sit in Malaysia and target Americans.

The pattern grew after the crackdown

Section 6 showed that the ads did not stop after the Government's April 2026 deadline. This section shows where they went. From July 2025 to April 2026, about 5 per cent of ads with a location were for a worksite outside Cambodia. From May to July 2026, the share was 55 per cent. This did not happen because new channels took over. It happened inside the same channels and groups. One that had posted 259 Cambodian ads and 3 foreign ones before May posted 43 Cambodian and 70 foreign after it. Another went from 3 per cent foreign to 78 per cent. A third, from 4 per cent to 83 per cent. The channels, the recruiters' usernames, the ad formats and the readers stayed the same. Only the country in the "Location" line changed.

This is what "cutting the grass, not the root" looks like on a map. The root is not a building in Poipet. It is a recruiting system: a set of Telegram channels and groups, and the people who run them. That system can send workers to any country where a compound is open. When Cambodia raids a building, the system posts an ad for Malaysia.

8. Where the Job Ads Point on the Map

An ad can name any town it likes. A map pin, however, is harder to fake. 147 of the ads in this dataset contain a Google Maps link that the recruiter added, "Map: <https://maps.google.com/maps?q=...>", showing where the applicant should go. Some collection tools add a general town location automatically. Those were removed. These pins are the ones the recruiter chose. Many ads reuse the same pin, so the 147 links point to 35 distinct locations.

In June 2025, Amnesty International published the locations of 53 scam compounds in Cambodia, checked by satellite images and by interviews with people who had been held inside them.²¹ This report placed the 147 recruiter pins on the same map. 115 of them, 78 per cent, fall within 500 metres of one of Amnesty's compounds. 124 (84 per cent) are within one kilometre. Only five are more than five kilometres from any compound on the list, and one of those is 74 kilometres away, which is almost certainly a mistake in the ad. Most pins are in Sihanoukville (78) and Bavet (56). A few are in Poipet, Phnom Penh, Koh Kong and Chrey Thom. Sixteen different compounds on Amnesty's list have at least one job ad pointing at them.

Table 2. Five pinned ads, the market they name, the building they name, the distance from the ad's map pin to the nearest compound on Amnesty International's 2025 list, and what Amnesty documented there.

Ad	Market named in the ad	Location named in the ad	Pin distance	What Amnesty documented
4 Dec 2025, Sihanoukville	Europe: "Add Contact (European Zone)", night shift 8 p.m.–8 a.m.	"China Town Building 23"	25 m from SI01	Human trafficking, forced labour, torture, enslavement. Police intervened 2022 and 2023; abuse documented again 2025.

²¹Amnesty International, "I Was Someone Else's Property": Slavery, Human Trafficking and Torture in Cambodia's Scamming Compounds, Index ASA 23/9447/2025, June 2025, Annex I (table of scamming compounds).

Ad	Market named in the ad	Location named in the ad	Pin distance	What Amnesty documented
19 Aug 2025, Sihanoukville	Korea: "Find Korean customers - Via TikTok / Facebook / MEFF / Instagram"	"China Town, Building 25, Room 2201"	25 m from SI01	(same compound)
16 Jul 2025 – Jan 2026, Bavet (9 ads)	Korea: "Add Contact (Korean Market)"	"Lee Macau, Bavet, Building A"	282 m from BA06	Deprivation of liberty, including of children. Police intervened early 2022; still operating mid-2024.
15 Dec 2025, Sihanoukville	(not stated): Add Contact, female Cambodian, 3 p.m.–3 a.m.	"Building 6, Jinbei"	67 m from SI08	Human trafficking, forced labour, torture, enslavement. Police intervened 2022; still operating late 2024.
1 Nov 2025, Poipet	India: "Add Contact, India Market", female only	Poipet	486 m from PO07	Human trafficking, forced labour, deprivation of liberty. No information that authorities investigated.

Where the pins go, and who the jobs are aimed at

Eighteen of the pinned ads also say who the victims are. On 4 December 2025, a Sihanoukville channel posted an *"Add Contact (European Zone)"* job, \$500 to \$700 a month, night shift from 8 p.m. to 8 a.m., at *"China Town Building 23"* [ad 376]. Its map link points 25 metres from the compound Amnesty calls SI01. Amnesty documented human trafficking, forced labour, torture and enslavement there. Police intervened in 2022 and again in 2023. Abuse was documented again in 2025.

Four months earlier, on 19 August 2025, the same pin appeared in an ad for *"China Town, Building 25, Room 2201"*: Add Contact, \$600 a month, one day off, *"Find Korean customers - Via TikTok / Facebook / MEFF / Instagram"* [ad 176]. Fourteen more pinned ads name Korea as the market. Nine of them, posted between July 2025 and January 2026, are for *"Add Contact (Korean Market)"* jobs at *"Lee Macau, Bavet, Building A,"* 282 metres from compound BA06 [ads 1133, 1138, 1140, 1143, 1148, 1154, 1166, 1184, 1416], where Amnesty documented deprivation of liberty (people held and not allowed to leave), including children. Police intervened there in early 2022. The site was still operating in mid-2024, and the ads show it hiring through January 2026. One pinned ad, for Poipet, names India as the market [ad 75]; it is 486 metres from compound PO07, where Amnesty found no sign that the authorities had ever investigated.

The two maps below show this on satellite images. They come from a mapping tool built for this investigation. It places three sets of points on the images: the map pins that recruiters put in their job ads; the compounds documented by Amnesty International; and the 156 locations (companies, branches and

service posts) that the Commercial Gambling Management Commission of Cambodia (CGMC) publishes on its website as licensed operators.²² Where an ad pin sits beside a CGMC-licensed site, the map marks it with an orange ring. Several do, in Sihanoukville and Bavet. This shows where the pins are, not who owns what. But it fits a finding Amnesty published on 2 April 2026: that casino owners licensed by the CGMC in December 2025 and January 2026 were in control of buildings where abuse had been documented.²³

How to read the maps: circles are ad pins (or, where the caption says so, building names placed by the mapping tool), labelled with the location the ad gives and, where the ad states one, the market. Red is for a pin used by ten or more ads, yellow for five to nine, purple for one to four, with an orange ring where the pin is near a CGMC-licensed site. Diamonds are Amnesty compounds, labelled with Amnesty's code and coloured by what Amnesty found: red for abuse that continued after a police intervention; yellow for some intervention; orange for not investigated; green for shut down.




Figure 8.1. Bavet, Svay Rieng province. Circles: map pins from the job ads, with the location and market the ads state: Macau – Market Korea; Lee Macau – Market China; Casino Macau – Market Vietnam; Magao Building 6; Lee Macau Building 9; Moc Bai – Magao Building CT F2; Crown Casino; Building 12; New Worlds Casino. Circle colours: red 10 or more ads, yellow 5–9, purple 1–4; orange ring = near a CGMC-licensed site. Diamonds: Amnesty International compounds BA06 (red: abuse continued after intervention) and BA11 (yellow: some intervention). Satellite imagery: Google.

Most of the ads that name the United States as the market, the largest group in the dataset, do not carry map pins, so this report cannot place them on a map.

²²Commercial Gambling Management Commission of Cambodia, list of licensed operators, cgmc.gov.kh/operators (accessed September 2026).

²³Amnesty International, "Cambodia: Casinos get state approval despite links to human rights abuse at scamming compounds," 2 April 2026; summarised in Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks* (June 2026), timeline entry for 2 April 2026.

One more building. On 15 December 2025, a Sihanoukville channel wanted a female Cambodian for Add Contact work at "Building 6, Jinbei", 3 p.m. to 3 a.m., one day off a month [ad 389]. The pin is 67 metres from compound SI08: human trafficking, forced labour, torture, enslavement; police intervened in 2022; still operating in late 2024. On 30 July 2026, the European Union placed sanctions on the Jin Bei Group and its chairman, describing the group as one that *"builds casinos and scam centre compounds in Cambodia."*²⁴



Figure 8.2. Sihanoukville, the "China Town" and "Jinshui" area. Circles: map pins from the job ads, with the location and market the ads state: China Town Building 23 – Market Europe; China Town Building 25 – Market Korea; China Town (Building 1) – Market Korea; China Town – Market Korea; Chinatown – Market India; Chinatown Building 12 – Market US; China Town Building 15 – Market Europe; China Town Buildings 11 and 12; Yongli Casino – Market Korea; Jinshui, Jinshui 1, Jinshui Building 7 (Room 3A666), Jinshui Building 9. Circle colours: red 10 or more ads, yellow 5–9, purple 1–4; orange ring = near a CGMC-licensed site. Diamonds: Amnesty International compounds SI01 (red: abuse continued after intervention), SI02 (green: shut down), SI42 (orange: not investigated) and SI04 (yellow: some intervention). Three of these labels, Chinatown Building 12 – Market US (an ad of 14 July 2025), China Town Building 15 – Market Europe (15 November 2025) and Chinatown – Market India (26 November 2025), come from ads that carry no recruiter pin; the mapping tool placed them by the building name the ad gives. All other circles are recruiter pins. Satellite imagery: Airbus / CNES, via Google.

Two limits on the pin comparison should be stated. First, this comparison uses Amnesty's 2025 list of 53 compounds. Amnesty's 2026 report added 33 more, so some pins that appear to miss may match compounds on the newer list. Second, a pin 25 metres from a compound shows that the ad is for that place. It does not show who owns the building or who runs the job.

²⁴Council of the European Union, Press Release 632/26, "Scam centres in Southeast Asia: EU lists seven persons and three entities responsible for serious human rights violations," 30 July 2026; Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1895, Official Journal of the European Union, 30 July 2026, entry 148 (Zhu Zhongbaio, Chairman of Jin Bei Group).

Even so, the main finding is simple. When the recruiters tell applicants where to go, four times out of five they point at a building that human rights researchers had already identified as a scam compound.

Inside the zones

Some ads name a zone as the workplace. Seven ads in this dataset say so directly. Three are for the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Laos. One, in Khmer, wants a female *"Real Model"* at \$5,000 to \$5,500 a month [ad 7909]. Two, in Chinese, want a female *"AI model"* for the *"Europe and America"* market at \$4,000 to \$5,000; it is the same ad, posted twice, three days apart [ads 6757, 6771]. One names no place at all: *"Company Location: Special Economic Zone. Betting Platform: US Market"* [ad 4964]. The other three name places in Cambodia. One is the *"Koh Kong Coastal Industrial Park"* [ad 4464]. One is the *"Yongli Industrial Park, No. 10 Jinshui"* in Sihanoukville, an address that nine other ads pin on the map, 234 metres from Amnesty's compound SI02 [ad 3255]. One, from 2023, says only *"inside the zone,"* Sihanoukville: Customer Service, \$1,200 to \$1,400, twelve hours a day, no days off, *"reside inside the zone"* [ad 7814]. The wider dataset adds three more. An *"OP Economic Zone"* in Bavet, in the area that three other ads pin 208 metres from Amnesty's compound BA05 [ad 3991]. A *"Moc Bai Special Economic Zone,"* also in Bavet [ad 1689]. And *"Thma Da, Pursat"* [ad 2301], the zone where Amnesty documented seven compounds.²⁵ Thirty-eight Chinese-language ads call the workplace a 园区, a "park," the industry's own word for a compound. One promises the site is *"not a park, no confinement"* [ad 3227]. An ad shows what the recruiter wrote, not where the job really is. This report repeats the ads' words. It has not checked any of these sites.

Table 3. Zones named in the job ads: the zone, where it is, what kind of place it is (as the ad describes it), how the ads name it in the original language, how many ads, and what they offer.

Zone	Where	What kind of place	How the ads name it	Ads	Dates, jobs and pay
Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone	Bokeo, Laos	Special economic zone (Laos)	"Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Bokeo, Laos"; 金三角特区; Khmer: "Lao border, Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone"	12 (98 for Laos in all)	Apr – Jul 2026. Model Real \$5,000–5,500; Model AI \$4,000–5,000, Market: Europe and America. UN: 6,364 removed 2022–24, 25 recognised as victims.
Unnamed special economic zone	Not stated	Called an SEZ by the ad	"Company Location: Special Economic Zone. Betting Platform: US Market"	1	Feb 2026. Model / AI face-swap assistant, Europeans and Americans preferred; single room; salary on evaluation.
Koh Kong Coastal Industrial Park	Koh Kong, Cambodia	Industrial park (ad's term); dashboard label "SEZ"	Khmer: ស្ថានីយភូមិកម្មឆ្នេរសមុទ្រខេត្តកុងកុង (stored as "SEZ, Koh Kong")	1	Jan 2026. Receptionist, find guests via TikTok; \$600 + %; 4 p.m.–4 a.m.

²⁵Amnesty International, "I Was Someone Else's Property" (June 2025), Annex I, TD01A–TD01G, Thma Da, Pursat province.

Zone	Where	What kind of place	How the ads name it	Ads	Dates, jobs and pay
Dara Sakor concession	Koh Kong, Cambodia	Land concession (not an SEZ)	"Dara Sakor", "Long Bay, Dara Sakor", "Dara Sakor, Sea View Building"; 七星海	44	Apr 2023 – Jul 2026. Mixed roles.
Yongli Industrial Park, Jinshui	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	Industrial park (ad's term)	"5th Floor, Building A, Yongli Industrial Park, No. 10 Jinshui, Xigang"	1 (plus 9 pinned "Jinshui" ads)	Jan 2026. Sales, \$800; 5 p.m.–5 a.m.; 1 day off. Jinshui pins are 234 m from Amnesty SI02 (Figure 8.2).
"Inside the zone", Sihanoukville	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	Unspecified zone	Khmer: ក្នុងតំបន់, "reside inside the zone"	1	Apr 2023 (oldest zone ad). Customer Service, Chinese required; \$1,200–1,400; 12 h/day; no days off.
OP Economic Zone / Moc Bai zone	Bavet, Svay Rieng, Cambodia	Called an economic zone / SEZ by the ads	"OP Economic Zone, Bavet"; 木牌经济特区 ("Moc Bai Special Economic Zone"); 木牌园区; "Moc Bai" in 234 Bavet ads	2 explicit (234 Moc Bai)	Oct 2024 – Jul 2026. The OP and Macau pins in Figure 8.1; Amnesty BA05 and BA06 are here.
"OP Prince Park"	Bavet, Svay Rieng, Cambodia	园区, "park" (compound slang)	OP太子园区; "Cambodia Moc Bai Prince recruiting back-office positions"	2	Nov 2025 – Jan 2026. 太子 is the Chinese name of the Prince Group, sanctioned by the EU on 30 July 2026; the ad alone does not prove the link.
Thma Da special economic zone	Pursat, Cambodia	Special economic zone (confirmed by Amnesty)	Khmer: ពោធិ៍សាត់ ថ្មងា, "Thma Da, Pursat"	1	Jan 2026. Add Contact, \$500–600; 3 p.m.–3 a.m. Amnesty's TD01A–G compounds are in this zone.
"No. 8 Smart Park"	Kampong Cham, Cambodia	园区, "park"	磅湛8号智慧园区	18	Dec 2025. Chinese-language ads.
园区 ("park") as the word for the workplace	Sihanoukville 22, Bavet 8, Pailin 2, Chrey Thom 1	Slang for a compound	"free to enter and leave the park"; "not a park, no confinement"	38	Apr 2025 – Apr 2026. The industry's own word for a compound.




Figure 8.3 (left). The ad of 17 May 2026, in Khmer: female "Real Model," "only English," \$5,000 – 5,500, 11 p.m. – 11 a.m., four days off, food and room; location "Lao border, Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone." Figure 8.4 (right). The ad of 21 April 2026, in Chinese: "AI model," female, Asian, one year's experience, English, \$4,000 – 5,000, 10 p.m. – 10 a.m., "Market: Europe and America," workplace "Golden Triangle Special Zone" (金三角特区).





Figure 8.5 (left). The same Golden Triangle ad, posted three days earlier on 18 April 2026. The recruiter reposts until the job is filled. Figure 8.6 (right). The ad of 12 February 2026: "Company Location: Special Economic Zone. Betting Platform: US Market." "Model / AI Face-Swapping Voice & Video Assistant," "Europeans & Americans preferred," \$400 meal allowance, single private room, ten hours a day, one day off a week, salary "discussed after candidate evaluation." Screenshots saved by the investigation's mapping tool. Channel names, usernames and links are covered in grey; dates and view counts are left as they were.

Khmer and Chinese lines quoted in this part are translated by the investigation; where the ad carried its own English text, that text is used.

9. Why the Root Survives: The Officials Who Were Paid by the Scam Industry

Section 6 showed that the ads did not stop when the Government said the compounds were closed. Sections 7 and 8 showed where the jobs went and where they still are. This section asks why. The answer

in the documents is not that the police cannot find the compounds. It is that, in case after case, the officials whose job was to close them were, according to the Government's own charges, being paid by the scam industry.

Four Cases: Officials Charged at Each Step of the Shutdown

To close a scam compound, the Government must do four things. It must control the border, so workers cannot be brought in. It must control immigration, so foreigners cannot stay without permission. It must raid the compound and keep the evidence safe. And it must control the visa system, so the papers cannot be bought. In 2026, during the crackdown itself, the Government's own courts and its anti-corruption body charged the officials in charge of all four.




Figure 9.1. The four cases on a timeline, July 2025 to September 2026. Above the line: what the Government said. Below the line: the four cases in which the Government removed or charged its own officials, at each of the four gates. Dates are those of the press reports cited in this section.

The border. In January 2026, the Interior Ministry removed seven senior officials from their posts and ranks within two days. Six were police at the Stung Treng provincial headquarters, including a brigadier general who was deputy commissioner of the Border Police. The ministry said they had worked with four Lao "masterminds" to bring people across the Cambodia–Laos border illegally. The seventh was a three-star general, the deputy head of the General Department of Immigration. The ministry said he was removed for "personal issues."²⁶

Immigration. On 22 April 2026, one week before the Government's deadline for the compounds to close, the Anti-Corruption Unit arrested two more generals. One was a lieutenant general, the deputy head of the General Immigration Department. The other was a major general, the Phnom Penh deputy police chief in charge of immigration. They were charged with taking bribes from online scammers during the

²⁶Cambodianess, "Seven Officials Stripped of Rank in Cambodia Amid Trafficking Allegations," 20 January 2026.

crackdown in Phnom Penh, and with money laundering (hiding where dirty money comes from). If found guilty, each faces seven to fifteen years in prison.²⁷

The raid. On 1 June 2026, a Phnom Penh prosecutor charged 54 police and military police officers with stealing and destroying evidence. Thirty-two were national police, among them the deputy police chief of Kampot province and a district police chief. Police had raided a casino near the Prek Chak border crossing with Vietnam, linked to a well-connected tycoon, and seized equipment as evidence. The officers were accused of cutting the locks on the building and going in to steal that evidence.²⁸ In other words, the raid happened. Then the police came back for the proof.

The visa. On 24 August 2026, the Anti-Corruption Unit sent three Foreign Ministry officials to court. One was a former director general of the department that handles visas and border affairs. They were charged over more than 6,000 visas which, the Unit said, were used by foreigners working in online fraud. The charges include abuse of power and money laundering. The director general had been dismissed on 28 April 2026, two days before the deadline. He was then given a new post as an adviser to the same ministry, at the same rank.²⁹

Four cases, at four gates, all brought within the eight months in which the Government said the problem was solved. The charges were made in that period; when the conduct happened, the reports mostly do not say. None of the four has reached a verdict yet (a court's final decision), so the officials are charged or demoted, not convicted. But the charges come from the Government itself, not from a human rights group. In its own court papers, the Cambodian Government is saying that its border police, its immigration generals, its provincial police and its visa officials were part of the industry it says it closed.

What Happened at the Compounds: Police Tip-offs and Collusion

Human rights research shows the same thing at the level of one building. Amnesty International found proof of a state intervention (a raid, an inspection or a rescue) at only 24 of the 86 compounds it identified during the crackdown. That is 25 per cent. Amnesty found that these interventions were "reactive rather than proactive": the police acted after pressure or after a video had spread, not before.³⁰ Eight survivors told Amnesty that guards or managers "told them the police were coming and they had to go."³¹ Amnesty's conclusion was that "probable collusion between compound managers and local authorities", meaning managers and police working together, had weakened the raids.³² A year earlier, a Vietnamese survivor named Diep told Amnesty what she had seen on her boss's phone: a Telegram group that appeared to be used to coordinate with the Cambodian police. She said the police in her town "work for

²⁷Khmer Times, "Senior officers arrested for bribery in crackdown on online scams," 23 April 2026.

²⁸CamboJA News, "Over 50 Police, Military Police Charged With Online Scam Evidence Theft in Kampot," 1 June 2026.

²⁹CamboJA News, "Over 6,000 Illegal Visas Issued; 3 Foreign Ministry Officials Charged," 24 August 2026.

³⁰Amnesty International, Falling Through the Cracks: Cambodia's "Crackdown" on Scamming Compounds and the Victims it has Failed (June 2026), Executive Summary and section 5.3.1.

³¹Amnesty International, Falling Through the Cracks (June 2026), section on forced transfers between compounds during the 2025–2026 crackdown.

³²Amnesty International, Falling Through the Cracks (June 2026), Executive Summary, finding 3.

the compound and will report requests for help back to the compound bosses." When she asked the police to rescue her, her bosses came to her first.³³

Above the compound

The same research says who is above the local police. In May 2026, the researcher Jacob Sims told the United States Congress that the industry has three layers. The first is foreign criminal money. The second is a "territorial protection layer": the people who own the compounds, run the casinos and control the border areas. The third is a layer of politically connected Cambodians who give the other two "access, legitimacy, regulatory insulation, and proximity to state power", which in plain words means cover from the law and a way in to the Government.³⁴ His main example is the founder of the Prince Group, who was given Cambodian citizenship and a diplomatic passport and "became a cabinet-level adviser to both Hun Sen and Hun Manet."³⁵ OCCRP, a network of investigative journalists, traces this back thirty years, to a system in which the biggest tycoons were also made senators for the ruling party.³⁶ The UN Office on Drugs and Crime puts it in one sentence: "large-scale scam centre operations could not exist without some official complicity", meaning that some officials must be helping.³⁷ Two of those senators are now under United States sanctions, which block them from the US financial system. Asked about them, the Prime Minister said: "I think that is a personal legal matter for them."³⁸

What the four cases show, and what they do not

The four cases are the Government's own evidence that the system was compromised. But they all stop at generals, provincial police and ministry officials. None reaches the layer above them: the compound owners, the tycoons and the senators. The two senators under United States sanctions have not been charged in Cambodia. A Cambodian analyst called the January removals "strategic scapegoating," in which "officials who become politically inconvenient or too visible are removed, while others with equal or greater involvement continue to hold power."³⁹ This report cannot say whether that is right. What it can say is that the charges did not stop the hiring. During the crackdown, 13 new recruiting channels and groups opened, Poipet's ads were back to 67 a month by July, and 332 ads still asked for workers by nationality [ad 7647]. Every one of those workers needs someone to let her in and someone to let her stay.

This is why the raids cut the grass but not the root. A raid closes one building. But if the officials who guard the border, issue the visas and lead the raids can be paid, as the four cases allege, the business is not

³³Amnesty International, "I Was Someone Else's Property": Slavery, Torture and Trafficking in Cambodia's Scamming Compounds (June 2025), testimony of Diep, compound OS01.

³⁴Jacob Sims, written statement to the United States House of Representatives, 19 May 2026.

³⁵Sims, written statement, 19 May 2026.

³⁶OCCRP, "How Cambodia Became a Haven for Criminals."

³⁷UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), A "Wicked Problem": Seeking Human Rights-Based Solutions to Trafficking into Cyber-Scam Operations in South-East Asia, quoting UNODC.

³⁸Hun Manet, interview with Bloomberg (Avril Hong), 23 July 2026.

³⁹Seng Vanly, quoted in Cambodianess, "Seven Officials Stripped of Rank in Cambodia Amid Trafficking Allegations," 20 January 2026.

closed; it is warned, and it moves. A business that has moved still needs staff, so the recruiters keep posting. The root is not a building. It is a business that can move, and a system that lets it move.

10. Telegram: The App Where the Recruiters Post, and Why the Ads Stay Up

Every ad in this report was posted on Telegram. Why did the recruiters choose it? What does the company do about them? And what has Cambodia's Government said about the app where its scam compounds hire people? This section answers those three questions.

What Telegram Is, and How Big It Is

Telegram is a messaging app. It has private chats, like WhatsApp. It also has "channels" and "groups." A channel is a public page. One person posts, and anyone can read. A group is a page where all members can post. The job ads in this report were posted in channels and groups.

Telegram is very big. Its founder, Pavel Durov, wrote in March 2025 that the app had "significantly over 1 billion monthly active users."⁴⁰ A monthly active user is a person who opens the app at least once a month. He said this makes Telegram the second most popular messaging app in the world, outside China. He said the average user opens the app "21 times daily" and spends "41 minutes on the app every day." He said the company made "\$547M in profit in 2024." These are the company's own numbers, not checked by anyone else. But they show how large the space is where the recruiters post.

Why the Recruiters Use Telegram

The UN migration agency, IOM, says recruitment into scam compounds now happens mostly online. Telegram, Facebook and WhatsApp are the apps that victims report most often.⁴¹ The UN human rights office describes how it works. A recruiter posts a job in a normal job group. Then the recruiter moves the conversation to a private app, such as Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal or LINE.⁴² These apps use "end-to-end encryption." That means only the two people in the chat can read the messages. No one else can see them, not the police and not the company. The same UN report says something else. Groups that try to warn people about scam jobs often find their own accounts removed. The recruiters' accounts stay up.⁴³

Telegram is also where the rest of the industry does business. Amnesty International found taxi drivers advertising in Telegram groups. Their price lists included routes like Poipet to Chrey Thum. Amnesty calls this "not a typical travel route." It is a road between two compound towns.⁴⁴ A scam network stopped by OpenAI used ChatGPT to write its messages to victims "on messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram."⁴⁵

⁴⁰Pavel Durov, Telegram post, 20 March 2025.

⁴¹International Organization for Migration (IOM), Key Facts: Human Trafficking into Online Scam Operations.

⁴²UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), A "Wicked Problem": Seeking Human Rights-Based Solutions to Trafficking into Cyber-Scam Operations in South-East Asia, section on recruitment through digital platforms.

⁴³OHCHR, A "Wicked Problem", same section.

⁴⁴Amnesty International, "I Was Someone Else's Property": Slavery, Torture and Trafficking in Cambodia's Scamming Compounds (June 2025), p. 61.

⁴⁵OpenAI, "Disrupting a Criminal Scam Operation."

What our 37 channels and groups show

The ads in this report come from 37 channels and groups. We know the subscriber count for 30 of them. Together, those 30 have about 39,000 subscribers. Twelve of the 37 were still posting in July 2026. The other 25 had stopped. Some may have been removed by Telegram. Some may have simply gone quiet. Telegram does not tell a reader which. We know the creation date for 29 of the 37. Thirteen of those were created after July 2025, when the Government's crackdown began. On one day, 17 September 2025, one operator opened four channels and groups at once. In three years of data, nothing shows a channel or group being closed because of what it posted. Some went quiet. New ones opened. The ads carried on.

What Telegram says

Telegram's rules forbid scams. WIRED tested this. It sent the company a list of two dozen channels that advertised "AI model" jobs and other compound jobs. Afterwards, "the company did not appear to remove any of the channels."⁴⁶ A Telegram spokesperson told WIRED that scam content "is explicitly forbidden by Telegram's terms of service and is removed whenever discovered." But the spokesperson also said that a job asking for a person's face can have "legitimate reasons," so each case "must be examined on a case-by-case basis."⁴⁷

This is not new. In June 2025, WIRED reported on the Chinese-language markets on Telegram that sell scam services. Telegram had "purged" them, that is, closed them down. Then, in WIRED's words, it "watched as they rebuilt." The largest of these markets, Huione Guarantee, quickly came back under new names.⁴⁸ A channel costs nothing to open. Closing one closes nothing.

What the Government says

Cambodia's Government has said a great deal about the compounds. In the documents we hold, it has said nothing about the app where the compounds hire. But it has given the app its support in another way. In June 2023, Hun Sen, who had led Cambodia for 38 years, left Facebook. He did this after Meta's oversight board, an independent panel that reviews Facebook's decisions, said he should be suspended for six months. The reason was a video in which he threatened his opponents with a "stick."⁴⁹ He had 14 million Facebook followers, in a country of about 17 million people. He told the country he was moving to Telegram. He said Telegram was "more effective." He said it was easier to use in countries that ban Facebook, "such as China." He urged people to follow him there.⁵⁰ Human Rights Watch called Telegram "the favoured social media messaging system of despots ranging from Russia to Myanmar."⁵¹ Three years

⁴⁶WIRED, "'100 Video Calls Per Day': Models Are Applying to Be the Face of AI Scams" (2026).

⁴⁷WIRED, "'100 Video Calls Per Day'", Telegram spokesperson quoted.

⁴⁸Matt Burgess and Lily Hay Newman, "Telegram Purged Chinese Crypto Scam Markets — Then Watched as They Rebuilt," WIRED, 23 June 2025, as cited in Jacob Sims, written statement to the United States House of Representatives, 19 May 2026.

⁴⁹ABC News (AP/Reuters), "'Facebook Prime Minister' of Cambodia, Hun Sen, switches to Telegram after Meta board urges suspension," 29 June 2023.

⁵⁰ABC News, 29 June 2023, same article.

⁵¹Phil Robertson, Human Rights Watch, quoted in ABC News, 29 June 2023.

later, Hun Manet gave Bloomberg an interview about the crackdown. He spoke about security agencies, economic zones and generals. He did not mention where the jobs are advertised.⁵²

Telegram is not a secret place. The job ads are public. Anyone can read them. Amnesty International also used public Telegram groups to find compounds in 2026: people posted videos and photos of the buildings there, and Amnesty used them to locate the sites.⁵³ Amnesty does not say which groups it read, and we do not claim they were ours. The point is simpler. The ads in this report were never hidden. Any police officer could have read them. Any official could have read them. The recruiters post in public, on the app that Cambodia's leaders chose to use themselves. The ads are there for anyone to see. The people with the power to act are not looking.

11. Two Concerns for the Future

This report has not offered recommendations. Amnesty International, the UN and others have already told the Government of Cambodia and Telegram what they should do, and this report has nothing to add to those lists. What it can add is what the ads show about where this industry is going. The two concerns below are the author's own view. Each one is based on evidence already given in this report.

The First Concern: What Was Built in Cambodia Is Being Copied Elsewhere

Where this kind of scam began is not known. What the documents show is that Cambodia was the place where it grew. This is where the compounds were built, where the criminal networks were formed, where protection from officials was bought, and where the technology was developed (Sections 8 and 9). The ads show what happened when the raids came. The recruiters did not stop; they changed the "Location" line. From July 2025 to April 2026, about 5 per cent of ads with a location were for a job outside Cambodia. From May to July 2026, it was 55 per cent (Section 7). In the 18 days after the Government said no compounds remained, 193 of 306 ads were for Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Pakistan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand (Section 6). And the ads recruit Pakistanis for Islamabad, Filipinos for the Philippines and Vietnamese for Vietnam. In other words, the industry is following its workers home. The author's concern is this. The countries that once sent workers to Cambodia's compounds are now getting compounds of their own. These are run by people who learned the work in Cambodia, and they target the same victims. The ads do not show the end of this. They show the beginning.

The Second Concern: Scam Work Is Becoming Ordinary Work

The ads are written as ordinary job ads. In Khmer they say បុគ្គលិក, "staff," 1,919 times. They offer a salary, food, a room, days off, a bonus for attendance and a raise every three months. Then they take away the one thing that usually stops a person from applying: the need for experience. 264 ads say no experience is needed, 160 say the company will teach the job, and 61 say both. One ad, posted four times in January 2026, says: Add Contact, customers in the USA, no experience is fine, someone will teach you, \$550 to \$1,000 a month, Khmer, male or female.

⁵²Hun Manet, interview with Bloomberg (Avril Hong), 23 July 2026.

⁵³Amnesty International, *Falling Through the Cracks* (June 2026), annex of compound locations; sources described as videos and images "anonymously posted to Telegram chat groups."

The people who answer such ads describe the work in the same way. In September 2026, three former workers told the news site Kiripost what the jobs had been.⁵⁴ One, from Kampong Cham, was introduced by a relative to a job in Sihanoukville. He was "mainly attracted by the promise of a high salary." The company gave him a computer, a script and a room, and told him to find customers on social media. He earned \$500 to \$600 a month, plus a payment for each customer he found, and worked twelve hours a day with one or two days off a month. He "did not fully understand that the work was connected to online scams." When the crackdown came, he "resigned." A former colleague offered him another job in Poipet. He has now been unemployed for five months. His friends from poorer families, he said, "need jobs to support their family"; some are now farmers or factory workers. Another worker, aged 19, found a restaurant job on a "significantly lower" salary. Around the closed compounds, landlords and food sellers lost their customers. Asked about them, a Government spokesman said former workers "should seek other income" and contact the Labour Ministry.

This is the author's concern. For these workers, the scam compound was not a place they were tricked into. It was a job. A relative introduced them to it, they took it for the pay, they did it for a year, they resigned from it, and then they lost it. Amnesty International told the same reporter that some people who leave the compounds return to them "in search of another way out."⁵⁵ The ads in this report, in Cambodia and now in Malaysia, Laos and Pakistan, are written for exactly these people. When scam work has become a job that people can lose, the question is no longer only how to rescue the workers. It is also how to stop the next ones from applying.

How to Recognise These Ads

The ads are the warning. Sections 3 to 5 show what they look like. The signs are these. The job title is "Model," "Model real face," "AI model," "Add Contact," "Killer" or "Customer Service," with a "Market" line naming a foreign country. The pay is far above a normal salary for a job with no qualifications. The ad says the passport will be "kept by the company." The shift is 12 hours or more, with one or two days off a month. The ad says "No Khmer" or names the nationality it wants. The ad names a casino, a "park," a "zone" or a building number instead of a company. The contact is a Telegram username and nothing else. One of these signs is a reason to ask questions. Three together are a reason not to go.

12. How This Report Was Made and What Its Data Can and Cannot Show

What the data is

This report is built on 4,991 job ad postings. They were collected from 37 public Telegram channels and groups that advertise work in Cambodia. The oldest posting is from April 2023 and the newest from 20 July 2026. The ads are in Khmer, Chinese and English. Many mix two or three languages in one post.

How the ads were read

Each ad was broken into its parts: job title, location, salary, gender, age, language, typing speed, working hours, days off, food, accommodation, passport rules, and the "Market" or target country. A script did the

⁵⁴Kiripost, Lach Socheata, "Scam Crackdown Leaves Former Workers Struggling to Find New Jobs," 15 September 2026.

⁵⁵Montse Ferrer, Amnesty International, quoted in Kiripost, 15 September 2026.

first pass. The results were then checked by hand. Khmer and Chinese lines quoted in this report were translated by the investigation. Where an ad carried its own English text, that text is used as it is. Salaries stated in other currencies (Thai baht, Turkish lira, Chinese yuan and others) are not included in the US-dollar pay figures. The counts in Section 11 of ads that mention training (160) and that mention both no experience and training (61) come from a search of the ad text in all three languages.

Postings, ads and jobs

The unit of counting is the posting. One recruiter often posts the same ad many times, in one channel or in several. Of the 4,991 postings, 3,672 are different texts, 1,294 (26 per cent) are exact copies of another posting, and 25 are pictures with no text. Grouping by job title, location, salary and contact gives roughly 3,100 different job offers. The report counts in two ways, depending on the question. When the question is how much the recruiters were posting, and when, the report counts every posting, because a recruiter who posts the same ad ten times is working ten times as hard to fill the job (Part II). When the question is what the jobs are like, the report counts each different ad once, because ten copies of one ad describe only one job (Part I). A repost is not an error in the data. It means the job was still open and the recruiter was still looking.

How the Maps Were Made

Section 8 uses three layers. First, the map pins that recruiters put in their own ads: 147 ads, pointing to 35 different places. Second, Amnesty International's 2025 list of 53 compounds. Third, the 156 locations that the Commercial Gambling Management Commission publishes as licensed operators. Distances in this report are measured only from the recruiters' own pins. The investigation's mapping tool also places some of the place names written in the ads on a map, but those are not used for any distance figure.

Where the poster sits

Telegram does not show where the person running a channel is. The report therefore says "recruiting for sites in Cambodia," never "recruiters in Cambodia."

The channels and groups

Of the 37, twelve were still posting in July 2026. The other 25 last posted between June 2025 and April 2026. They may have stopped, or Telegram may have removed them; the data cannot say which. The creation date is known for 29 of the 37. Subscriber counts are known for 30.

The 18-day test

The passage "After the last claim" in Section 6 uses a separate, smaller collection: posts from five of the twelve active channels and groups, 28 August to 14 September 2026, read by hand. Its counts are kept apart from every other figure in this report.

Are the ads real?

Anyone can post on Telegram, so it is fair to ask whether these ads are what they appear to be. Five things say they are. First, they are public posts, each with a message number and a date, in channels and groups whose histories go back as far as 2023. Second, there are 4,991 of them, in three languages, from 37

channels and groups, over three years, and they use the same job titles, pay scales, shift patterns and addresses throughout. Third, they match evidence gathered by others who never saw this dataset: four out of five map pins fall beside compounds that Amnesty International located from satellite images and survivor interviews; WIRED reviewed channels of the same kind and found the same jobs; and three former workers described to Kiripost, in September 2026, exactly the jobs the ads describe. Fourth, the Government's own raids took place at the towns and buildings the ads name. Fifth, the raw exports are preserved as collected, and the live links are held in the confidential annex, so any investigator can go to the source. A fabrication of this size and consistency would be a larger operation than most of the compounds it describes.

What the data cannot show

An ad shows what a recruiter wrote. It does not show whether the job exists as described, whether anyone took it, or what happened to them. The report describes what the ads offer, never what workers received. It cannot see inside a building. It cannot say whether a compound is open; it can only say whether someone is hiring for it. Amnesty's 2026 list of 86 compounds came out after the map comparison was made, so some pins that seem to miss a compound may match one on the newer list.

Rules followed

No channel, group or recruiter is named. This is deliberate, for four reasons. Naming a channel would tell readers where to find these ads, and so would advertise the recruiters. It would warn the recruiters before any investigator could act, and a channel can be deleted in a minute. The evidence in this report is what the ads say, not who posted them. And the report accuses no individual, so no individual should be identifiable from it. No worker is named either. Quotations from ads are marked as quotations; the report's own reading of them is marked as the report's. Every number in this report can be traced to the dataset, and the rule used to count it is listed in a numbers ledger published with the public dataset. Every outside fact can be traced to a document held by the investigation. A number in square brackets after a quotation, such as [ad 7726], is the ad's number in the dataset; Appendix A lists every ad cited. Ads from the 18-day test are marked [test ad] with the message number from that collection, listed in Appendix B. Appendix C describes the 37 channels and groups without naming them, and Appendix D lists the 35 map pins with their coordinates.

What is available, and to whom

The evidence behind this report is released in layers. First, this report and its appendices are public. Second, the full dataset is public: all 4,991 postings and the 59 postings of the 18-day test, with the complete original text of every ad, its date and its parsed fields. In this public file the channel and group names, the usernames, the links and the recruiters' contact handles inside the ad text have been removed; everything else is as collected, so that every count in this report can be checked with the numbers ledger and every quoted ad read in full. Third, journalists who wish to verify further can request the confidential annex, which restores the names, usernames, links and screenshots, on a written undertaking not to publish the names or contact the recruiters before an agreed date or before the authorities have acted. Fourth, the confidential annex and the raw exports have been given in full to the relevant authorities. Requests should be addressed to the author.

About the author

Moses Ngeth is a digital security consultant and digital rights advocate. This investigation was self-supported. The author has no affiliation with any government, political party, company or organisation named in this report.

Sources

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Platform

Pavel Durov, Telegram post, 20 March 2025.

Data

4,991 job ad postings from 37 public Telegram channels and groups, collected April 2023 – 20 July 2026 (main dataset).

306 job ads from five channels and groups, 28 August – 14 September 2026 (18-day test, Section 6).

Channel and group metadata for the 37 channels and groups (creation dates, subscriber counts, status as of July 2026).

Appendix A: Ads Cited in This Report

One row for each ad cited in the text, in the order in which the ads first appear. The number is the ad's number in the dataset. Job title, location and market are as the ad gives them (translated where the ad is in Khmer or Chinese). Pay is the range the ad states. No channel, group or recruiter is named, for the reasons given in Section 12.

Ad ID	Date	Job title	Location the ad gives	Market	Pay (per month)	Language of post
7726	2026-07-16	Model Real	Poipet, Cambodia	Europe	4,000–6,000 USD	English
6736	2026-04-12	Model Real (Live)	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	US/Europe market	3,500 USD	Chinese
346	2025-06-24	Recruitment Service				Multiple languages
1348	2025-12-30	Add Contact	Bavet, Cambodia		500–600 USD	Khmer
1832	2025-08-23	Add Contact	Bavet, Cambodia		500–700 USD	Khmer
7251	2026-06-20	Add Contact		USA	400 USD	Khmer
1895	2025-10-27	Add Contact	អគ្គរវិហារ, Sihanoukville, Cambodia		600–1,000 USD	Khmer
1813	2025-08-11	Customer Service	Bavet, Cambodia		700 USD	Khmer
236	2025-09-23	Customer Service	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		600–800 USD	Khmer
6651	2026-06-25	Model Real	Poipet, Cambodia	European	3,000–6,000 USD	Multiple languages
5243	2026-04-01	Customer Service	Poipet, Cambodia	America, Japan	900 USD	
4820	2026-03-30	Call Center	Siem Reap, Cambodia		1,000–2,000 USD	Multiple languages
1748	2026-01-01	Killer	ឆាយណាថេរ, Sihanoukville, Cambodia		750 USD	Khmer
6009	2026-04-14	Money Mule	Istanbul, Turkey	European, crypto	70,000 USD	Others
2105	2026-01-07	Translator	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		1,500–3,000 USD	Khmer
5709	2026-03-31	AI Model Developers	Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam		3,000–4,000 USD	Chinese
5723	2026-04-03	AI Model Developers	Hanoi, Vietnam		3,000–4,000 USD	Chinese
7206	2026-06-13	Call Center	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	America, Europe	4,000 USD	
4314	2026-01-02	Model Translator	Caitong Town, Chrey Thom, Cambodia		4,000 USD	
5608	2026-03-27	Model Real	Bangkok, Thailand	Europe, Western (US/Europe)	6,000–7,000 USD	Chinese
7639	2026-07-10	Model Real	Myanmar		3,000–5,000 USD	English
7813	2023-04-23	Add Contact	អគ្គរវិហារ16, Sihanoukville, Cambodia		700 USD	Khmer
7823	2023-05-13	Translator	Sihanoukville, Cambodia			Chinese
679	2025-07-11	Add Contact	Toul Kork, Phnom Penh, Cambodia		600–800 USD	
4640	2026-03-01	Translator	Phnom Penh, Cambodia		3,500–5,000 USD	English
4357	2026-01-30	Live Model	Pursat, Cambodia	US Stocks	7,000 USD + 500 allowance	
7647	2026-07-10	Model Real	Poipet, Cambodia	Europe	4,000–6,000 USD	English

Ad ID	Date	Job title	Location the ad gives	Market	Pay (per month)	Language of post
7689	2026-07-12	Model Real	Sihanoukville and Poipet, Cambodia		4,000–5,000 USD	English
4370	2026-01-31	Model Real	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	Europe, Europe + Middle East	5,000–6,000 USD	English
4367	2026-01-30	Model Real	Dara Sakor, Cambodia		6,000 USD	Khmer
6114	2026-04-14	Model Real	Poipet, Cambodia	America, Australia, Europe, European, Japan	6,000–6,500 USD	
7556	2026-07-18	Add Contact	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Australia, New Zealand		Khmer
4423	2026-03-04	Call Center	Caitong, Chrey Thom, Cambodia	Japan	8,000–12,000 USD	Chinese
6663	2026-07-02	Model Real	Malaysia		10,000–12,000 USD	
2740	2025-11-29	Add Contact	មុកបាយ អគារ5C ជាន់ទី5 បន្ទប់ 509, Bavet, Cambodia	Mexico, Russia	500 USD	Khmer
4150	2023-08-02	Add Contact	Poipet, Cambodia		18,000–30,000 THB	Khmer
177	2025-08-20	Customer Service		Crypto	1,000–2,000 USD	Multiple languages
7641	2026-07-10	Model Real	Cambodia	Europe	4,000–6,000 USD	English
3518	2025-12-27	Live Model		America, European	5,000 USD	
1822	2025-08-14	Customer Service	Bavet, Cambodia		700 USD	Khmer
2353	2026-02-03	Add Contact		Australia	450–1,000 USD	Khmer
2776	2025-11-26	Add Contact	អគារណពនហៃ, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	Europe, Japan (FB IG TikTok), Japan (FB,	500–700 USD	Khmer
1839	2025-09-02	Customer Service	ក្រាំងផ្លូវ, Tboung Khmum, Cambodia	Brazil	800–1,200 USD	Khmer
4122	2023-10-29	Customer Service	Phnom Penh, Cambodia		700 USD	Khmer
1169	2025-08-15	Finance	Dynasty អគារ A5, Bavet, Cambodia		800 USD	Khmer
4628	2026-02-25	Customer Service	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	Philippines		English
4173	2026-02-21	Add Contact	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		700 USD	English
1681	2025-09-13	Customer Service			40–40,000 THB	English
4664	2026-03-09	Call Center	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	USA	500 USD	English
5292	2026-04-01	Call Center	Poipet, Cambodia	America, India	800–1,100 USD	English
4037	2024-08-02	Customer Service	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		800–1,300 USD	Khmer
7830	2023-05-21	Customer Service	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		700–850 USD	Khmer
330	2025-05-05	Salesperson (India Market)	Building 7, My Casino, Kampot, Cambodia	India	600 USD	Khmer
5364	2026-04-02	Customer Service	Poipet, Cambodia		800 USD	English
6794	2026-05-07	Model AI	Poipet, Cambodia		4,000 USD	Khmer
7904	2026-05-11	Model Real	Poipet, Cambodia		6,000–7,000 USD	Khmer
7235	2026-06-17	Add Contact	Cambodia		1,000 USD	Chinese
7801	2026-07-19	Team Leader (Khmer web)	Poipet, Cambodia	Khmer website	400–700 USD	Khmer

Ad ID	Date	Job title	Location the ad gives	Market	Pay (per month)	Language of post
6961	2026-07-08	Telephone Operator (Model)	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia	America, European, United States	3,000–5,000 USD	English
6985	2026-07-14	Model AI	Islamabad, Pakistan	America, Asian Americans in the United S	3,000–4,000 USD	English
7943	2026-07-20	Model Real	Myanmar	Cryptocurrency, USA, USA (Cryptocurrency	6,000–7,000 USD	English
6605	2026-05-17	Model Real	Kyaukse, Myanmar	Western market	7,000–300 USD	Multiple languages
6595	2026-05-11	Model Real	Three Pagodas Pass, Myanmar	European	5,000–6,000 USD	Multiple languages
6982	2026-07-13	Model Real	Dubai, United Arab Emirates	America, European, United States	6,000 USD	English
4393	2026-02-11	Model Real	China	America, European, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzsta		Chinese
4399	2026-02-20	Model Real	China	America, European, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzsta		Chinese
376	2025-12-04	Add Contact (European Zone)	China Town Building 23, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	European	500–700 USD	
176	2025-08-19	Add Contact	China Town, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	Korean	600 USD	Khmer
1133	2025-07-16	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1138	2025-07-25	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korean	700 USD	Khmer
1140	2025-07-31	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1143	2025-08-02	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1148	2025-08-04	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1154	2025-08-07	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1166	2025-08-14	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1184	2025-09-04	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korea	700 USD	Khmer
1416	2026-01-10	Add Contact	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia	Korean	700 USD	Khmer
75	2025-11-01	Add Contact	Poipet, Cambodia	India	560 USD	Khmer
389	2025-12-15	Add Contact	អគារ 6, ជីនប៉ី Jinbei6, Sihanoukville, Cambodia		600 USD	
7909	2026-05-17	Model Real	Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Bokeo, Laos		5,000–5,500 USD	Khmer
6757	2026-04-18	Model AI	Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Bokeo, Laos	America, Europe	4,000–5,000 USD	Chinese
6771	2026-04-21	Model AI	Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, Bokeo, Laos	America, Europe	4,000–5,000 USD	Chinese
4964	2026-02-12	Model AI		America, European		English
4464	2026-01-20	Add Contact (TikTok)	SEZ, Koh Kong, Cambodia		600–800 USD	Khmer
3255	2026-01-08	Customer Service	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		800 USD	Khmer
7814	2023-04-29	Customer Service	Sihanoukville, Cambodia		1,200–1,400 USD	Khmer
3991	2024-10-08	Add Contact	Bavet, Cambodia		800 USD	Khmer
1689	2025-09-14	Customer Service & Withdrawal	Special Economic Zone, Bavet, Cambodia		800–1,200 USD	

Ad ID	Date	Job title	Location the ad gives	Market	Pay (per month)	Language of post
2301	2026-01-27	Add Contact	KY, Toul Tompoung, Phnom Penh, Cambodia		500 USD	Khmer
3227	2026-01-10	Customer Service	Giant Compound, Sihanoukville, Cambodia		1,000–1,500 USD	Chinese

Appendix B: The 18-Day Test, 28 August – 14 September 2026

The 59 postings for sites in Cambodia found in five channels and groups in the 18 days after the Government's statement of 27 August 2026 (Section 6). The five channels and groups are shown as A to E. The test ad ID is the posting's message number in that channel or group, as exported; it is the number used in the text as [test ad]. Job words are the job terms found in the posting.

Test ad ID	Date	Channel/group	Town named	Job words
5677	2026-08-28	E	Bavet	Calling
547	2026-08-29	C	Pailin	Model, Translator
548	2026-08-29	C	Sihanoukville	Model, Translator
1596	2026-08-29	D	Pailin	–
1597	2026-08-29	D	Sihanoukville	Model
5699	2026-08-30	E	Sihanoukville	–
5702	2026-08-30	E	Phnom Penh	Calling
551	2026-08-31	C	Poipet	Model, Translator
1598	2026-08-31	D	Pailin	–
1599	2026-08-31	D	Sihanoukville	–
5714	2026-08-31	E	Koh Kong / Dara Sakor	Sales/Marketing
5722	2026-08-31	E	Phnom Penh	Calling
5726	2026-08-31	E	Sihanoukville	Translator
5731	2026-09-01	E	Sihanoukville	–
5742	2026-09-01	E	Sihanoukville	–
5744	2026-09-01	E	Sihanoukville	Translator
5745	2026-09-01	E	Phnom Penh	Calling
5748	2026-09-02	E	Sihanoukville	Customer Service
5749	2026-09-02	E	Sihanoukville	–
563	2026-09-04	C	Sihanoukville / Phnom Penh	Model, Translator
5762	2026-09-04	E	Phnom Penh	Model
5767	2026-09-05	E	Koh Kong / Dara Sakor	Model
565	2026-09-06	C	Phnom Penh	Model, Translator, Sales/Marketing
571	2026-09-07	C	Poipet	Model, Translator
577	2026-09-08	C	Sihanoukville	Model, Translator
1609	2026-09-09	D	Sihanoukville / Phnom Penh	–
1613	2026-09-09	D	Phnom Penh	Translator, Sales/Marketing
5818	2026-09-09	E	Phnom Penh	–
473088	2026-09-10	A	Cambodia (no town)	Receptionist
473105	2026-09-10	A	Poipet	Model
473111	2026-09-10	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473113	2026-09-10	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473120	2026-09-10	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473122	2026-09-10	A	Poipet	Model
5835	2026-09-10	E	Poipet	Model
473155	2026-09-11	A	Poipet	Model
473227	2026-09-11	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473228	2026-09-11	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473229	2026-09-11	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473258	2026-09-11	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)

Test ad ID	Date	Channel/group	Town named	Job words
473273	2026-09-11	A	Cambodia (no town)	Call center
473287	2026-09-12	A	Poipet / Sihanoukville	Model, Add Contact, Customer Service, Ca
473293	2026-09-12	A	Cambodia (no town)	Call center
473317	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473318	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473319	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473338	2026-09-12	A	Cambodia (no town)	Call center
473342	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473348	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473349	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473350	2026-09-12	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
152	2026-09-12	B	Siem Reap	Model
473374	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473376	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473377	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473418	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473419	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473421	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)
473422	2026-09-13	A	Poipet	Web marketing team leader (Khmer)

Appendix C: The 37 Channels and Groups

The 37 public Telegram channels and groups from which the ads were collected, numbered 1 to 37 and not named. Creation date is from Telegram where known. First and last post are the first and last postings in the dataset. Status is as of July 2026: Active means the channel or group was still posting in July 2026; Stopped or removed means it had stopped posting, or had been removed, before then (the data cannot say which).

No.	Created	First post in dataset	Last post in dataset	Postings	Subscribers	Status, July 2026
1	unknown	2023-04-08	2026-07-10	91	unknown	Active
2	2023-07-12	2023-07-12	2026-01-22	309	1859	Stopped or removed
3	2023-12-26	2026-04-03	2026-07-20	58	2528	Active
4	2024-08-02	2025-11-20	2026-03-20	99	372	Stopped or removed
5	2024-12-10	2025-09-13	2026-01-31	61	3536	Stopped or removed
6	2024-12-23	2025-11-25	2026-01-16	20	48	Stopped or removed
7	2025-01-22	2025-12-26	2026-01-26	32	55	Stopped or removed
8	2025-02-22	2025-11-21	2026-07-17	134	919	Active
9	2025-03-16	2025-06-10	2025-11-12	20	2329	Stopped or removed
10	2025-03-16	2025-10-14	2026-01-16	70	3160	Stopped or removed
11	2025-03-25	2025-12-20	2026-06-14	28	143	Stopped or removed
12	2025-04-14	2025-04-14	2026-06-26	142	864	Stopped or removed
13	2025-04-16	2025-04-16	2025-06-29	20	528	Stopped or removed
14	2025-04-28	2025-07-11	2026-03-13	205	563	Stopped or removed
15	2025-04-29	2025-12-22	2026-02-13	26	225	Stopped or removed
16	2025-06-17	2025-07-11	2026-02-05	130	310	Stopped or removed
17	2025-06-17	2026-01-21	2026-07-18	468	1841	Active
18	2025-07-05	2026-01-27	2026-07-18	478	414	Active
19	2025-07-11	2025-07-11	2026-07-18	400	256	Active
20	2025-07-11	2025-07-11	2026-03-06	252	1243	Stopped or removed
21	2025-09-17	2025-09-17	2026-01-23	87	337	Stopped or removed
22	2025-09-17	2025-09-17	2025-12-24	11	83	Stopped or removed
23	2025-09-17	2025-09-17	2026-01-23	67	112	Stopped or removed
24	2025-09-17	2025-09-17	2026-01-23	25	155	Stopped or removed
25	2025-09-17	2025-07-05	2026-01-29	22	1149	Stopped or removed
26	2025-10-07	2026-02-22	2026-04-03	181	7411	Stopped or removed
27	2025-10-26	2026-01-07	2026-02-13	89	1824	Stopped or removed
28	2025-10-26	2026-01-03	2026-07-08	389	1689	Active
29	2025-10-26	2025-12-21	2026-01-10	27	1912	Stopped or removed
30	2025-11-01	2025-11-01	2026-01-14	136	219	Stopped or removed
31	unknown	2026-01-01	2026-07-12	162	unknown	Active
32	unknown	2026-01-01	2026-03-13	68	unknown	Stopped or removed
33	unknown	2026-01-01	2026-03-13	67	unknown	Stopped or removed
34	unknown	2026-01-02	2026-04-02	124	unknown	Stopped or removed
35	unknown	2026-01-10	2026-02-22	82	unknown	Stopped or removed
36	unknown	2026-02-22	2026-07-19	217	2928	Active
37	unknown	2026-04-14	2026-07-18	194	unknown	Active

Appendix D: The 35 Map Pins in the Ads

The 35 distinct map locations that recruiters put in their ads (147 ads in all), used in Section 8. Coordinates are latitude and longitude as given in the ad's Google Maps link, and can be pasted into any map service. The location names are those the ads give for that pin (up to three, translated where in Khmer). The nearest compound is the closest site on Amnesty International's 2025 list, with the straight-line distance. One pin, in Kampong Cham, is 74 km from any listed compound and is treated in Section 8 as a probable error in the ad.

Coordinates (lat, lon)	Location the ads give	Ads	Dates of the ads	Market stated	Nearest Amnesty compound	Distance
11.64666, 105.81406	Kampong Cham, Cambodia	1	2025-05-18 to 2025-05-18	Crypto	BA03	73.8 km
11.06866, 106.17671	OP ខាងក្រោយកាស៊ីណូ Crown, Bavet, Cambodia / តំបន់ OP, Bavet, Cambodia	3	2025-10-06 to 2026-01-10	—	BA05	208 m
11.07104, 106.16804	ម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia / ស៊ីម៉ាកាវ, Bavet, Cambodia / Magao, Bavet, Cambodia	34	2025-07-16 to 2026-01-10	Korea, China	BA06	281 m
10.93067, 106.12786	Shang Hai, Bavet, Cambodia	4	2025-12-20 to 2026-01-10	—	BA06	16.1 km
11.07101, 106.16761	ស៊ីម៉ាកាវ អគារ 9, Bavet, Cambodia	1	2026-01-10 to 2026-01-10	—	BA06	316 m
11.06988, 106.16527	New Worlds Casino, Bavet, Cambodia / Bavet, Cambodia / New World Casino, Bavet, Cambodia	5	2025-07-16 to 2026-01-24	—	BA11	256 m
11.07900, 106.17004	Heng Heng 3, Building 1, Bavet, Cambodia / Heng Heng 3, Building 4, Bavet, Cambodia / Heng	8	2025-08-08 to 2026-01-30	Bangladesh	BA13	213 m
10.95918, 105.06109	Caitong, Chrey Thom, Kandal Province, Cambodia	1	2025-11-20 to 2025-11-20	—	CT05	724 m
11.64644, 102.91409	G1, Koh Kong, Cambodia	1	2025-04-20 to 2025-04-20	—	KK01	394 m
13.65180, 102.57028	Poipet, Cambodia	4	2025-08-30 to 2025-10-24	—	PO07	1,474 m
13.63871, 102.57776	Poipet, Cambodia	1	2025-10-28 to 2025-10-28	Crypto	PO07	192 m
13.64410, 102.57488	Poipet, Cambodia	1	2025-11-01 to 2025-11-01	India	PO07	486 m
13.65419, 102.56970	Poipet, Cambodia	1	2025-06-10 to 2025-06-10	—	PO10	1,336 m
13.66091, 102.56329	Poipet, Cambodia	1	2026-01-10 to 2026-01-10	—	PO10	645 m
13.66139, 102.55572	ផ្សារដើមទ្រូ, (ផ្សារចិន), Poipet, Cambodia	1	2025-09-13 to 2025-09-13	—	PO18	464 m
11.58499, 104.90355	Parkway, Phnom Penh, Cambodia	2	2025-10-26 to 2026-01-02	Crypto	PP23	175 m
10.57937, 103.55706	China Town, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Chinatown, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Sihanoukville,	28	2025-07-11 to 2026-01-15	Korean	SI01	24 m
10.57565, 103.55464	Jinshui, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Jinshui បន្ទប់ 3A666 អគារ 7, Sihanoukville, Cambodia /	9	2025-07-11 to 2025-12-17	—	SI02	234 m

Coordinates (lat, lon)	Location the ads give	Ads	Dates of the ads	Market stated	Nearest Amnesty compound	Distance
10.57639, 103.55539	Yongli Casino, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	1	2025-11-02 to 2025-11-02	Korean	SI02	342 m
10.61492, 103.56442	Hulk casino, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Sihanoukville, Cambodia	6	2026-01-02 to 2026-01-15	Crypto	SI04	3,355 m
10.61522, 103.56436	Hulk Casino, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	5	2025-08-03 to 2025-12-06	Crypto	SI04	3,389 m
10.60840, 103.53225	អគារ 6, ជីនប៊ី Jinbei6, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Jinbe 6, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	3	2025-12-15 to 2025-12-26	–	SI08	67 m
10.60793, 103.53193	Jinbei 6, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / ជីនប៊ី 6, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	2	2025-12-04 to 2026-01-03	–	SI08	130 m
10.60792, 103.53195	អគារ 6 Jinbe6, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	1	2025-11-05 to 2025-11-05	–	SI08	130 m
10.63298, 103.50845	SV hotel, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Sihanoukville, Cambodia	2	2026-01-04 to 2026-01-29	–	SI12	273 m
10.62838, 103.50234	ផ្ទះពស់, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	4	2025-07-23 to 2025-08-02	–	SI15	186 m
10.62697, 103.50119	Snake House Hotel, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	2	2026-01-15 to 2026-01-15	–	SI15	188 m
10.61140, 103.50289	Lion King casino, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Lion Casino, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	3	2025-12-17 to 2026-01-15	Crypto	SI20	547 m
10.61088, 103.50488	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	1	2025-11-20 to 2025-11-20	Crypto	SI20	517 m
10.63669, 103.52731	Sihanoukville, Cambodia / huangle, Sihanoukville, Cambodia / Huangle, Sihanoukville, Cambo	3	2025-11-24 to 2025-12-14	–	SI32	107 m
10.63935, 103.50901	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	2	2025-07-12 to 2025-08-16	–	SI33	170 m
10.59637, 103.53868	Lile, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	1	2025-11-02 to 2025-11-02	–	SI37	1,000 m
10.59136, 103.54150	City Studio, Sihanoukville, Cambodia	2	2026-01-15 to 2026-01-15	–	SI42	1,192 m
10.64068, 103.53242	Sihanoukville, Cambodia	1	2025-11-24 to 2025-11-24	–	SI45	107 m
10.62131, 103.51317	អគារ បៃតង (អគារបៃតង), Sihanoukville, Cambodia	2	2025-08-10 to 2025-08-11	–	SI48	830 m